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TERRORISM, AMERICA'S POROUS BORDERS, AND
THE ROLE OF THE INVASION CLAUSE POST-
9/11/2001
[On September 11, 2001, a] patch of blue sky that should not have
been there opened up in the New York skyline .... [T]he heavens
were raining human beings. Our city was changed forever. Our
country was changed forever. Our world was changed forever.'
I. INTRODUCTION
A perfect world is a world without borders. In this world, concerns
regarding terrorism, suicide bombers, war, chemical, biological, and nuclear
attacks, missiles, anthrax-laced mail, shoe bombs, crop dusters, hijackers,
skyscrapers, color-coded terrorist alerts, defense strategies, and smallpox
vaccinations do not pollute the thoughts and dreams of mankind. In this
world, mass slayings in the name of religion and ideology are fictional, and
every individual on the planet lives in peace and harmony as one nation.
Regrettably, a group of terrorists have thrust open our nation's collective
eyes to reveal an ominous reality: Our world is far from perfect. The terrorist
acts of September 11, 2001 catastrophically and poignantly illustrated that in
the name of safety and security, the vision of a borderless world must remain
a vision for the future. On September 11, 2001, terrorists invaded our country
in the worst possible way-and the world will never forget this day.
As a result of the 9/11 attacks, the majority of Americans have called for
enhanced homeland security measures, including heightened border security
efforts.2 However, if Mohamed Atta, one of the 9/11 hijackers, "could send a
message from hell-where he surely went after he piloted American Airlines
Flight 11 into the World Trade Center-Atta would have good news for his
band of homicidal brothers around the world: The doors to America are still
wide open." 3 Although terrorists invaded our homeland soil on 9/11/01 and
America remains vulnerable to another terrorist attack, the federal government
has opted to employ only incremental efforts to strengthen the manpower and
security on America's borders. Chillingly, the terrorist invasion of 9/11 in
combination with our federal government's continuing lax border control
1. A JUST RESPONSE xi (Katrina Vanden Heuvel ed., 2002).
2. See infra Part II.
3. MICHELLE MALKIN, INVASION 3 (2002).
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policies exemplify the reality that our country remains highly vulnerable to
another terrorist attack.
What few Americans realize is that the federal government's failure to
provide sufficient border security for the states and the American people may
transgress a constitutional mandate. The United States Constitution provides
as follows: "The United States ... shall protect each of ... [the states] against
Invasion."4 This constitutional provision has rarely arisen as a topic of legal
commentary or as a question within the judiciary, which is likely attributable
to the fact that the 9/11 terrorist invasion of our mainland soil initiated a new
chapter in American history, as America has never been invaded in a manner
similar to the terrorist invasion of 9/11. However, after the hostile terrorist
invasion of our homeland on 9/11, this provision theoretically could impose
innumerable duties on the federal government.5 This Comment will address
only the most elementary and imminently necessary element of "protection"
that could be found to fall under the Invasion Clause's umbrella: border
control. Border control is the most fundamental method of protection that the
federal government can provide the states because our nation "cannot possibly
have a system that prevents [terrorism if it does not] begin with the issue of
border security.
' 6
Specifically, this Comment will address the role that the Invasion Clause
may play in increasing the number of border personnel and improving the
quality of technological equipment along the Canadian-American border in
the vast, unchartered areas between established border crossing points. This
Comment will not address whether the border control procedures utilized to
regulate the flow of people and commerce at established border checkpoints
constitute sufficient protection from invasion.
As discussed in detail in this Comment, because of various political
reasons, the political branches currently refuse-and will in all likelihood
continue to refuse-to sufficiently augment border security along the porous
Canadian-American border. This political inaction likely violates the
Invasion Clause and leaves our states and citizens largely unprotected from a
future terrorist invasion. Thus, if the Invasion Clause is to be enforced, the
4. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4. This constitutional provision is commonly referred to as the
"Invasion Clause."
5. To sufficiently protect the states from invasion, these duties could include, among countless
others, the following: improving airport security, revamping immigration regulations, creating
missile defense shields, increasing the number of law enforcement personnel, maintaining terrorist
lookout lists, and improving the visa system.
6. Northern Border Security Status: Hearing before the Subcomm. on Treasury and General
Gov 't of the U.S. Senate Comm. on Appropriations, 107th Cong. (2001) (hereinafter Senate Hearing]
(statement of Sen. Byron Dorgan, Chairman, Subcomm. on Treasury and General Gov't) (emphasis
added), LEXIS, News Library.
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structural mechanisms inherent in our federal government dictate that the
federal judiciary is the only means through which the federal government can
be ordered to comply with its constitutional duty.
Because of the well-documented congressional and executive apathy
relating to border security, this Comment urges the federal judiciary to reach
the merits of an Invasion Clause claim and render a decision in favor of the
states. To mandate governmental compliance with the Invasion Clause, the
states could file suit in federal court, requesting a declaration that the federal
government has failed to comply with the Invasion Clause and a mandamus
directing the President or the Director of Homeland Security, among others, to
comply with the Clause.7 In the alternative, the states could request damages
for funds expended on terrorism prevention and/or border control that can be
linked to the federal government's lax border control policies, and they could
request the Court to grant a mandatory injunction that requires the federal
government to pay the states restitution until the Invasion Clause is properly
enforced.8 In their claims for relief, the states could demand three possible
remedies: restitution, border militarization, or a mass hiring of Border Patrol
personnel and increased and improved technological equipment for the
northern border.
9
In reality, however, judicial enforcement of the Invasion Clause is much
easier theorized than accomplished. The only cases in which the states
alleged that the federal government failed to comply with the Invasion Clause
were dismissed as political questions. Consequently, the doctrine of standing
and the political question doctrine may bar any court from reaching the merits
of this issue. Additionally, the judiciary has always shied from mandating
presidential or congressional compliance with a constitutional provision, 0 and
until further information is obtained, it may be difficult for the judicial
branch-or any branch of the federal government for that matter-to
determine the number of border personnel and the amount and quality of
7. For a discussion addressing declaratory judgments and writs of mandamus used to direct
members of the government to comply with the Constitution or with a statute, see the following
decisions: Colgrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549 (1946); Smith v. Reagan, 844 F.2d 195 (4th Cir. 1988);
Walker v. Munro, 879 P.2d 920 (Wash. 1994).
8. Because courts will rarely, if ever, explicitly mandate congressional or presidential
compliance with a statute or the Constitution, a number of states resorted to this claim for relief when
requesting the federal judiciary to mandate governmental compliance with the Invasion Clause. See,
e.g., Chiles v. United States, 874 F. Supp. 1334, 1337 (S.D. Fla. 1994). For a detailed discussion of
these prior Invasion Clause cases, see infra Part IV.B.
9. Although some may vehemently disagree with border militarization, this Comment
advocates the position that, as long as someone is guarding our borders, any of the three remedies is
acceptable.
10. See supra notes 7-8 and accompanying text.
2003]
MARQUETTE LA W REVIEW
technological equipment that will suffice to protect the states from further
terrorist invasion.
While considering these counterarguments, this Comment avers a number
of rationales to support the contention that the current Court may opt to reach
the merits of an Invasion Clause claim and order the federal government to
augment border security. First, Part II of this Comment explains the necessity
for augmented Canadian-American border security. Part II also addresses
efforts that the political branches have employed since 9/11 to improve border
security, why these efforts are insufficient to protect the states from a future
terrorist invasion, rationales underlying the President and Congress's laissez
faire approach to border control, and the issue of border militarization. Part
III describes the role of the federal judiciary in interpreting and enforcing the
Constitution, and it explains the components of the doctrine of standing and
the political question doctrine, including a discussion of the scope of the
"modern" political question doctrine in the realm of domestic and foreign
affairs. Part IV analyzes case law in which the courts of the federal judiciary
found the states' allegations that the federal government's failure to properly
enforce immigration laws violated the Invasion Clause to be nonjusticiable.
Part V applies the doctrine of standing and the components of the political
question doctrine to the present Invasion Clause inquiry to determine whether
the federal judiciary could reach the merits of the states' Invasion Clause
claim brought against the federal government; this Part urges the Court to
mandate compliance with the Invasion Clause by means of augmented border
security before the blood of more Americans is shed.
I1. THE POLITICAL BRANCHES AND BORDER CONTROL
The statistics speak for themselves. Seventy-seven percent of Americans
assert that the government is not doing enough "to control the border and to
screen people allowed into the country."" Eighty-five percent of Americans
agree that "enforcement of immigration laws and the border has been too lax
and this made it easier for the [9/11] terrorists to enter the country."' 12
Seventy-nine percent of Americans want the government to militarize the
border.' 3 Yet, the popular democratic support for stricter border control has
11. Poll: Many Believe Lax Border Controls Contributed to Attacks, NAT'L J. CONG. DAILY,
Sept. 28, 2001, LEXIS, News Library.
12. Id.
13. The O'Reilly Factor: A Politician Who Supports Putting Troops on Our Borders (FOX
News television broadcast, Nov. 8, 2002), available at
http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,69555,00.html [hereinafter O'Reilly: A Politician Who
Supports Putting Troops on Our Borders]. Although these statistics are convincing, these polls may
exhibit flaws. The majority of Americans will quickly answer "yes" when asked if they want to be
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not caused the federal government to supply funding in an attempt to remedy
this problem. The only inquiry that rationally results from this scenario is as
follows: If the majority of Americans advocate stricter border control and
agree that our insufficient border security tactics do not thwart terrorists from
entering the country, why does the federal government fail to plug the border
with thousands more personnel and supply technological devices as best as
our nation's resources will allow? Americans have posed this question time
and time again, and each time we receive the same answers from most of our
representatives: rationalization, silence, claims that the government has added
more guards at the border, or utter avoidance of the question.
14
This Part will address and critique the political branches' current border
control policies. First, because this Comment focuses on the need for
augmented Canadian-American border security, the security dilemma along
this border will be discussed. Second, the federal government's efforts to
improve border control since 9/11 will be highlighted. Third, startling facts
and rationales will be presented to support the assertion that these efforts
currently are insufficient to protect the states from another terrorist attack.
Fourth, a number of rationales will be conjectured as to why the federal
government employs a laissez faire approach to border control issues. Lastly,
the issue of border militarization and the federal government's response to
this issue will be discussed.
A. The Canadian-American Border: An Unlikely Suspect
As one Border Patrol Agent declared after 9/11, "I believe the [Canadian-
American] border is so far out of control that we don't even have an idea how
far out of control it is.' 5  This Comment will focus on the need for
augmented Canadian-American, as opposed to Mexican-American, border
security. The northern border will be highlighted because of Canada's liberal
immigration policies and the country's existing lax border security.
1. Canada's Liberal Immigration Policies
Canada is widely known for its extremely liberal open-door immigration
safer in their homes, but that does not mean that all Americans desire to pay higher tax rates for this
enhanced security. These polls would be more accurate if they questioned whether Americans are
willing to pay a certain tax increase to fund increased protection along our borders.
14. See infra Part II.A-E. Although most American politicians avoid discussing our border
security problems as much as possible, a handful of politicians have employed proactive measures to
improve border security and protect our nation's citizens. Some of the politicians that have utilized
the media to speak out on this issue include Representative Tom Tancredo (R-Colo.), Senator Byron
Dorgan (D-ND), and Senator Robert C. Byrd (D-WV).
15. MALKIN, supra note 3, at 165.
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policy.' 6 Huge numbers of immigrants flock to Canada each year because of
this noninterventionist policy, creating a yearly increase of one percent in the
country's population.' 7 Refugees from countries such as Pakistan, Iraq, and
Lebanon are allowed into the country without passports or background
checks.18 The refugees are permitted to travel boundlessly about the country
until the date of an asylum hearing. 19 Approximately one-quarter of the
refugees fail to attend the hearing-and they disappear.2 ° Yet, because of
Canada's strong economic footing, many Americans feel much less threatened
by immigrants that enter our nation through the Canadian-American, as
opposed to the Mexican-American, border.2' This false sense of security
promotes decreased consternation among Americans with regard to the status
of Canadian-American border security.
Predictably, Canada's open-door immigration policy has caused the areas
of the country in close proximity to the United States to become sanctuaries
for criminals, including terrorists. 22 Canada's geographic location in relation
to the United States makes the country a favorite home for terrorists, 23
particularly because of Canada's accessible and technologically advanced
banking system.24 The city of Montreal is notorious for its links to terrorist
activity; the city recently was in the limelight for housing Ahmed Ressam
16. On the Record with Greta Van Susteren: 'Below the Radar'-Our Homeland Security
Investigation (FOX News television broadcast, Sept. 5, 2002), available at
http://www.foxnews.corn/story/0,2933,62300,00.html [hereinafter Van Susteren]; see also Patrolling
the Border, THE BURLINGTON FREE PRESS, May 29, 2002, LEXIS, News Library [hereinafter
Patrolling the Border, THE BURLrNGTON FREE PRESS] ("Years of Canada's generous immigration
policies have opened the door to many legitimate immigrants and refugees who provide Canada a
depth and multicultural flavor that is celebrated and encouraged."). Additionally, as one Senator
asserted: "The Canadians 'have policies that are so lax that Osama bin Laden could land there
tomorrow, claim refugee status and be allowed to walk into the nation .... They don't ask for proof
of identity or refugee status. All you have to do is claim it."' Julia Malone, Eyes in Sky Help Watch
Borders, DAYTON DAILY NEWS, Aug. 25, 2002, LEXIS, News Library (quoting Rep. Tom
Tancredo) [hereinafter Malone, Eyes in Sky Help Watch Borders].
17. David Phinney, Staging Terror From the North?, at
http://abcnews.com/sections/world/DailyNews/canada 991228.html (1999) [hereinafter Phinney,
Staging Terror].
18. Steve Brown, Security Concerns Along Canadian-U.S. Border, at




21. Catherine E. Halliday, Note, Inheriting the Storied Pomp ofAncient Lands: An Analysis of
the Application of Federal Immigration Law on the United States' Northern and Southern Borders,
36 VAL. U. L. REV. 181, 221-22 (2001).
22. Id. at 222.
23. MALKIN, supra note 3, at 76-77.
24. Halliday, supra note 21, at 222.
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before American border agents thwarted his conspired "Millennium terrorist
strike., 25 As many as fifty international terrorist organizations call Canada
home, including the Armed Islamic Group 26 and al-Qaida, 27 both of which are
linked to Osama bin Laden. 28  Distressingly, this terrorist activity may not
alarm Canadians to the extent that it alarms Americans: "Many Canadians feel
fairly comfortable that [they] are not going to be a target because there is a
bigger and better target next door."
29
2. Lax Protection on the Northern Border
Canada's liberal immigration policies combined with the fact that the
northern border is woefully undermanned amounts to a dangerous
combination for the citizens of the United States. Three different agencies are
assigned to protect our nation's northern border: the Immigration and
Naturalization Service (INS), the Customs Service, and the Border Patrol.3 °
Customs and the INS police "the cross-border flows of people and goods--on
roads, over bridges, through tunnels, and on ferries.' The Border Patrol
performs the task of "stopping or deterring illegal border crossings in the
mountains, deserts, and woods between established crossing points. 32
Because this Comment focuses on the lack of border security between
established crossing points, the severe understaffing of Border Patrol agents
on our northern border will be addressed in detail.
The Canadian-American border is approximately 4000 miles long.33 After
9/11, Congress appropriated funds to triple the number of INS inspectors and
Customs Agents on this border, thereby creating positions for a total of 1470
inspectors and 5319 agents.34 This congressional bill also tripled the number
25. Brown, Security Concerns, supra note 18. With regard to the arrest of Ressam,
Representative Lamar Smith of Texas stated: "This case is the best wake-up call that either Canada
or the U.S. are going to get." Phinney, Staging Terror, supra note 17.
26. Phinney, Staging Terror, supra note 17.
27. Patrolling the Border, THE BURLINGTON FREE PRESS, supra note 16.
28. Phinney, Staging Terror, supra note 17.
29. Brown, Security Concerns, supra note 18.
30. Council on Foreign Relations, Terrorism: Questions & Answers, at
http://www.terrorismanswers.com/security/borders.html (2002) [hereinafter Terrorism: Questions &
Answers]. These three agencies recently have been consolidated into the Department of Homeland
Security. See The Department of Homeland Security: Border and Transportation Security, at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/deptofhomeland/sect3.html (June 2002).
31. Terrorism: Questions & Answers, supra note 30.
32. Id.
33. Brown, Security Concerns, supra note 18.
34. Siobhan Gorman, A Nation Without Borders, THE NAT'L J., Dec. 1, 2001, LEXIS, News
Library [hereinafter Gorman, A Nation Without Borders].
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of Border Patrol agents from 300 to 900 agents.35 Conversely, the Mexican-
American border runs approximately 2000 miles, or half the length of the
Canadian-American border,36 and 9150 Border Patrol agents are stationed on
this border.37 Approximately 16,000 total Customs and Border Patrol agents
guard the Mexican-American border.38
This disparity is troubling: There is one Border Patrol agent for every one-
quarter mile on the Mexican-American border but only one Border Patrol
agent for every four miles on the Canadian-American border. It must be kept
in mind, however, that Border Patrol agents are not stationed uniformly
throughout the northern border: "The 917-mile stretch of border in the Grand
Forks sector has about one field agent for every thirty-eight miles,"3 9 and
"Detroit has only 20 [border guards] who are expected to train their eyes on
border crossings in three neighboring states as well."40  Because one
individual cannot be expected to effectively cover anywhere from four to
forty miles of rugged terrain at one time, it is much easier for terrorists to
crawl, walk, run, or swim into our nation through our northern border than
through our southern border.
Furthermore, not only is the manpower on the northern border lacking but
also the government has failed to implement any physical barriers at
established border checkpoints during times when the checkpoints are not
staffed. The northern border has a few gates along the border that will not
close-in Montana, they are "rusted open, so to speak."4' At other border
checkpoints along the northern border, the barriers set up at night consist of
42orange cones, and some people do not even have the courtesy to move the
cone before they illegally enter this country: "They come whipping through at
60 miles an hour and just shred the cone., 43 These ineffective barriers at
border checkpoints and along the rest of the border illustrate the ease with
35. U.S. To Triple Guards at Canadian Border, THE TORONTO STAR, Oct. 10, 2001, available
at http://www.northamericaninstitute.org/articlearchive/thestarl01001.htm [hereinafter U.S. To
Triple Guards].
36. Gorman, A Nation Without Borders, supra note 34.
37. Kevin Diaz, Ramstad Urges Reinforced Borders, STAR TRIBUNE, June 19, 2002, LEXIS,
News Library [hereinafter Diaz, Ramstad Urges Reinforced Borders].
38. U.S. to Triple Guards, supra note 35.
39. MALKIN, supra note 3, at 8.
40. Phinney, Staging Terror, supra note 17. Similarly, in Michigan, one Border Patrol team is
expected to cover 140 miles. Gorman, A Nation Without Borders, supra note 34. In Idaho, there are
only sixteen officers to watch over 400 miles of the Canadian border. Malone, Eyes in Sky Help
Watch Borders, supra note 16.
41. Senate Hearing, supra note 6 (statement of Sen. Conrad Bums (R-MT)).
42. Id. (statement of Sen. Dorgan).
43. Id.
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which terrorists can enter our country on established roadways under the
cover of darkness.
Lastly, the southern border receives considerably more technological
equipment than the northern border. In Michigan, "[t]wenty-eight field agents
were sharing one working boat and a remote surveillance camera that had
been out of service for six months." 44  In 2000, the INS transferred two
aircraft from the northern border to the southern border; the aircraft were to be
used on the southern border to locate illegal aliens lost in the desert.45 As a
result of constant equipment transfers from the northern to the southern
border, the northern border is both understaffed and without proper
technology to detect terrorists entering this country.
These security glitches on our northern border illustrate how
uncomplicated it is for a terrorist-especially a terrorist with resources-to
enter our nation through its porous and unguarded borders potentially carrying
biological, chemical, or nuclear weapons. 4  Morally and economically
speaking, our nation must maintain the flow of commerce, traffic, and people
through our borders, but it is just as important that we "keep out of this
country those who are not supposed to come in. ' 4 7 As it currently stands, our
nation's Canadian-American border control policies between checkpoints are
some of the most lax in the world. The FBI Director has warned that "walk-in
suicide bombings in America are 'inevitable,' '48 and the state of our nation's
border security is "not something that should make people sleep well
tonight.
' 49
B. Efforts to Improve Border Control Since 9/11
Despite this criticism of the federal government's border control policies
post-9/l 1, it must be noted that the government has employed a number of
proactive measures to improve border security and frustrate attempts by
44. MALKN, supra note 3, at 165.
45. Feds Call Canadian Border a Risk, at
http://www.newsmax.com/articles/?a=2000/7/9/210607 (July 10, 2000).
46. For an in-depth discussion regarding the nature and scope of these weapons, see GAVIN
DEBECKER, FEAR LESS: REAL TRUTH ABOUT RISK, SAFETY, AND SECURITY IN A TIME OF
TERRORISM 98-115 (2002).
47. Senate Hearing, supra note 6 (statement of Sen. Dorgan). Although our nation must strive
to thwart terrorist entry into the United States, we must not presume that all foreigners are terrorists.
Heman Rozemberg, Immigration Reform May Be a Casualty of Sept. 11 Terror, THE ARIZ.
REPUBLIC, Sept. 6, 2002, at IA, LEXIS, News Library.
48. MALKIN, supra note 3, at 229.
49. Liza Porteus, After Haitian Boat Incident, Critics Decry Ease of Getting Ashore, at
http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,67081,00.html (Oct. 30, 2002) [hereinafter Porteus, Critics
Decry Ease of Getting Ashore].
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terrorists to enter our country. These efforts are especially noticeable at
established border checkpoints. Since 9/11, funds have been appropriated to
promote further training and proficiency of INS inspectors 50 and to improve
the INS and the Custom Service's border security technology. 51  An
appropriation was also included for increased narcotics and antiterrorist
detection equipment to be used at border checkpoints.52 Additionally, as
mentioned earlier in this Comment,53 the federal government appropriated
funds to increase the quantity and quality of technological equipment at
border checkpoints and to triple the number of Border Patrol agents, Customs
Service personnel, and NS inspectors on the northern border.54 Border Patrol
agents were granted an increase in their annual basic rate of pay,55 and the
President's proposed 2003 budget includes funds to hire approximately 500
56
more security agents. A "comprehensive preparedness program" was
enacted; this program includes plans to train and equip border security agents
to counter the smuggling of weapons of mass destruction. 7
The federal government also has commissioned studies to evaluate border
control effectiveness. Studies were commissioned to determine the feasibility
of developing an intergovernmental network of electronic data systems that
operates between all countries participating in the visa waiver program,58 to
develop a method of enhancing the flow of commerce and people at border
checkpoints,59 to determine the feasibility of establishing a North American
Security Program between the United States, Canada, and Mexico, 60 and to
ascertain whether Customs Service personnel are provided appropriate
training.6'
To further improve border security, the federal government has attempted
to facilitate cooperation with the Canadian government. Canada and the
50. 8 U.S.C.S. § 1711 (Law. Co-op. 2002).
51. See Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-173, §
102, 116 Stat. 543, 102 (2002); Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools
Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT ACT) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-
56, § 402, 115 Stat. 272, 402 (2001).
52. Trade Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-2 10, § 312, 116 Stat. 933, 312 (2002).
53. See supra Part II.A.2.
54. USA PATRIOT ACT § 402.
55. See 8 U.S.C.S. § 1711.
56. Remarks by Senator Robert C. Byrd: "Protecting the Nation From Terrorist Attack," FIN.
TIMES INFO., Jan. 16, 2003, LEXIS, News Library [hereinafter Senator Byrd, Protecting the Nation].
57. 50 U.S.C.S. § 2353 (Law. Co-op. 2002).
58. 8 U.S.C.S. § 1772 (Law. Co-op. 2002).
59. Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-173, § 402,
116 Stat. 543, 402 (2002).
60. 8 U.S.C.S. § 1751 (Law. Co-op. 2002).
61. Trade Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-210, § 332, 116 Stat. 933, 332 (2002).
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United States have begun data sharing, and the FBI has granted the Royal
Canadian Mounted Police access to the fingerprint database.62 The INS and
other federal border inspection agencies are now permitted to conduct joint
U.S./Canada inspections on the international border.63 The United States and
Canada signed a "Smart Border Declaration" that implements measures to
provide for the secure flow of people and goods, to improve the border's
infrastructure, and to promote information and intelligence sharing between
64the two countries. Thus, the federal government has facilitated a number of
efforts to improve border security, and these efforts are especially beneficial
to aid in terrorist detection at established border checkpoints.
C. Remaining Vulnerability to Terrorist Attack
The federal government's efforts since 9/11 to remedy security troubles at
the northern border's established crossing points constitute a commendable
response to a complex and immense security issue. However, little has been
done to improve border security for the thousands of miles of open land
between these crossing points.65 The federal government's efforts are
insufficient to protect the states from further terrorist invasions and attacks, as
there "seems to be this ... disconnect between what the people who are on the
job in the field say they need and what we hear in Washington on the
organizational charts of what they need., 66  The federal government can
continue to sidestep controversy by appropriating funds and Border Patrol
guards in small increments, but "outside experts argue that more frontline
agents alone will provide little extra safety without a comprehensive strategy
for managing U.S. border security.,
67
62. All Things Considered: Controversy Over the Use of National Guard Troops to Patrol the
US Borders with Mexico and Canada (National Public Radio broadcast, Mar. 13, 2002), LEXIS,
News Library.
63. 8 U.S.C.S. § 1753 (Law. Co-Op. 2002).
64. The Smart Border Declaration: Building a Smart Border for the 21 Century on the
Foundation of a North American Zone of Confidence, at
http://www.canadianembassy.org/border/declaration-en.asp (Dec. 12, 2001).
65. As mentioned above, the government tripled the number of Border Patrol agents and
appropriated funds to improve technological support at the northern border after the 9/11 attacks.
See supra Part II.A.2. Yet, each guard is forced to cover, at the very least, four miles of unchartered
territory at one time, with many guards forced to cover much greater amounts of land. The
government's efforts since 9/11 do not sufficiently resolve the security dilemma on our borders.
66. Senate Hearing, supra note 6 (statement of Sen. Patrick Leahy).
67. Terrorism: Questions & Answers, supra note 30; see also Amy Borrus, Keep America 's
Gates Open. Just Watch Them Better, Bus. WEEK, Nov. 19, 2001, LEXIS, News Library ("[T]he
wave of illegal Mexican immigration in the 1990s occurred despite a threefold increase in patrol
agents along the southern border .... If hundreds of thousands of poor Mexicans can sneak into the
U.S. each year, so can a terrorist with a sophisticated support network."); Siobhan Gorman, et al.,
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The government's post-9/11 efforts are not sufficient to satisfactorily
improve border security at the areas of the border between established
crossing points, and these efforts fail to protect the states from further terrorist
invasion. Another terrorist attack will never be entirely preventable even with
increased security, but the federal government can decrease the likelihood of
another attack with increased border control. Although more Border Patrol
agents have been added along the northern border, these numbers still are not
sufficient to protect the states from a terrorist invasion because of the sheer
amount of territory these agents must cover.68 Additionally, current agents are
exiting their positions almost as quickly as they are being added: The San
Diego sector lost almost 200 Border Patrol agents in the first six months of
2002, as many agents departed for higher paying jobs as airport security
guards and air marshals. 69 Even after 9/11, many of the established crossing
points on our northern border are manned during only daylight hours,70 and
criminals "know the times when the fewest [agents] are on duty, and they plan
their illegal operations accordingly.",71  Further, a number of widely
publicized incidents involving individuals who illegally entered this country,
including the Washington D.C. "Serial Sniper" and a freighter filled with
Haitian refugees, remind us precisely why the government's border control
efforts have proven unsatisfactory since 9/11.72 Despite these documented
Preventing New Attacks, THE NAT'L J., Aug. 10, 2002, LEXIS, News Library [hereinafter Gorman,
Preventing New Attacks] ("In lieu of coming to terms with illegal immigration or focusing on how to
restructure the INS, the federal government's policy is merely to beef up personnel along the
borders .... ).
68. See supra Part II.A.2 and note 65.
69. Border Sieve: Terrorists Can Join Masses Sneaking Into U.S., THE SAN DIEGO UNION-
TRIB., Aug. 12, 2002, at B-6, LEXIS, News Library [hereinafter Border Sieve].
70. Office of Management and Budget, Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year
2003: Protecting the Homeland, at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/fy2003/bud05.html (last
visited Feb. 10, 2003).
71. Feds Call Canadian Border a Risk, at
http://www.newsmax.com/articles/?a=2000/7/9/210607 (July 10, 2000) (quoting report by Justice
Department Inspector General Robert Asbaugh).
72. One cannot easily forget the images of Haitian refugees streaming off a fifty-foot wooden
freighter at the Florida shore, and these individuals were able to reach the shores of our nation in the
middle of the day. Porteus, Critics Decry Ease of Getting Ashore, supra note 49. One retired Border
Patrol agent saw this incident as "proof that anyone can enter the country illegally if he tries hard
enough." Id. Similarly, our nation will be haunted by memories of John Lee Malvo, the Washington
D.C. "serial sniper"; prior to his acts of murder, the Border Patrol handed Malvo over to the INS
under the assumption that he would be deported after it identified him as an illegal alien and detained
him. The O'Reilly Factor: Tension Between U.S. Border Patrol Agents vs. the INS (FOX News
television broadcast, Oct. 29, 2002), available at
http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,66967,00.html. Instead, the INS released him, illustrating that
our nation's security problems stretch far beyond our unmanned borders. Id.; see also The O'Reilly
Factor: The War Between the Border Patrol & the INS (FOX News television broadcast, Nov. 18,
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problems on our northern border, the current Administration is attempting to
cut funding for border security by $705 million,73 even though an estimated
480,000 new illegal aliens entered the United States in the ten months
following 9/1 1.74
Additionally, the technological equipment acquired since 9/11 has been
widely written off as inadequate. Since 9/11, the technological devices have
been used "too haphazardly and sporadically to significantly bolster
security,, 75 and most of the equipment purchased since 9/11 "has largely been
the same as the gear already in use.', 76 Small airplanes are still able to fly
undetected from Canada to small airports in northern Minnesota, and officials
admit that the radar view in this area is incomplete.77 Some Border Patrol
sectors have received new equipment, such as specialized cameras, to be
utilized for terrorist detection, but because these sectors still lack manpower,
it is understandable why one border agent asserted that he has "never met a
camera that can climb down from a pole and take an illegal alien [or terrorist]
into custody. 78 Further, our federal government does not hesitate to equip
troops overseas with high-tech equipment (these troops are, by the way,
guarding borders of other countries), 79 but it refuses to provide the personnel
guarding our borders with comparable equipment. As one Senator asserted:
Our troops in the desert are bouncing their communications off of
satellites, while our homeland defenders may have to communicate
with twine and coffee cans .... When it comes to fighting overseas,
this Administration's attitude is spare no expense. When it comes to
fighting the war here at home, this Administration prefers to shop in
bargain basements.80
The attacks of 9/11 distressingly illustrated the reality that protection is
2002), available at http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,70693,00.html [hereinafter O'Reilly: The
War Between the Border Patrol & the INS].
73. Senator Byrd, Protecting the Nation, supra note 56.
74. Matthew Maddox, Military Needed to Enforce U.S. Border, THE BATTALION, July 1, 2002,
LEXIS, News Library [hereinafter Maddox, Military Needed to Enforce U.S. Border]. One can only
hope that none of the aliens entering through our northern border were terrorists.
75. Gorman, Preventing New Attacks, supra note 67.
76. Id.
77. Van Susteren, supra note 16. As one commentator stated with respect to this security
concern: "[T]here are so many ways to cross our northern border into the United States... that it
would seem to me a ... general aviation aircraft would be a lot more trouble than one needed to go to
to get across the border." Id.
78. MALKIN, supra note 3, at 8.
79. Maddox, Military Needed to Enforce U.S. Border, supra note 74.
80. Senator Byrd, Protecting the Nation, supra note 56.
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not a prerequisite in our workplaces, schools, and homes. The legislative and
executive branches must either deploy troops or greatly increase the number
of Border Patrol agents and equipment on the northern border so this task
does not have to fall elsewhere, but it has become apparent that these branches
are willing to employ only incremental measures to improve security. In the
meantime, terrorists can enter and exit our nation through the porous northern
border virtually at will.
D. Rationales Underlying the Political Branches'Laissez Faire Approach to
Border Control
Despite the incidents documented above, which illustrate our
government's failure to protect the states from a terrorist invasion, the federal
government has refused to plug our nation's borders. Two chief rationales
can be advanced for this refusal. The first rationale is the federal
government's ubiquitous desire for political correctness as well as concerns
regarding international relations. The second rationale relates to the economic
implications plugging our borders will have for the nation.
1. Political Correctness and International Relations
"[T]he exclusion of persons from entry into the United States for
ideological or political beliefs has long been a source of controversy,"8' and
for a Republican White House that is strapped for minority votes,8 2 any loss of
support could mean a loss of employment in 2004. On numerous occasions,
commentators have criticized harshly the President and other politicians for
their failure to address border control issues in order to obtain and retain
minority votes, especially those of Mexican-Americans. 3 Even Homeland
81. William J. Krouse & Raphael F. Per], CRS Report for Congress: Terrorism: Automated
Lookout Systems and Border Security Options and Issues, at http://www.fas.org/irp/crs/RL31019.pdf
(June 18, 2002). Augmenting border security on the southern border is a particularly sensitive issue
after an American Marine Patrol Officer was involved in the 1997 shooting of an eighteen-year-old,
unarmed, Mexican goat-herder. See Rebecca Phares. U.S./Mexico Border: In the Woke of the
A ttacks, Border Tightens, Relationship Chills, at
http://www.rtfcam.org/repot/volume_21/No_4/article 3.htm (Oct. 2001) [hereinafter Phares, Border
Tightens, Relationship Chills].
82. See W. James Antle Ill, Courting Minorities a GOP Challenge, at
http://conservativetruth.org/opinionet/archives/jamesantle/07-08-02.shtml (July 8, 2002).
83. See, e.g., Gorman, Preventing New Attacks, supra note 67 ("[T]he White House has been
reluctant to address the problem of illegal immigration, for fear of upsetting Hispanic voters."); M.E.
Sprengelmeyer, Tancredo Assails Bush Policy; GOP Congressman Says Open Border Invites
Terrorism, ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS, Apr. 20, 2002, at 1B, LEXIS, News Library [hereinafter
Sprengelmeyer, Tancredo Assails Bush Policy] ("Bush is pushing to give certain illegal immigrants
amnesty partly out of misguided 'altruism,' but also to woo Hispanic voters .... ); The O'Reilly
Factor: Talking Points: Trouble on Our Borders (FOX News television broadcast, May 24, 2001),
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Security Director Tom Ridge has not forgotten his political affiliation: When
asked why he would not deploy the National Guard to the southern border, he
replied that there are "political and cultural reasons" for not doing so.8 4 Well,
"[a]t least Ridge is honest. He's telling you, 'We want Hispanic votes."' 85 As
one commentator pithily asserted with respect to these political shenanigans:
"There's a fine line between reaching out and selling out our national security
for votes. 86
Similarly, some have suggested that President Bush's close relationship
with Mexican President Vicente Fox constitutes a barrier to augmented border
control.8 7 President Fox visited the United States immediately preceding
9/11; prior to the terrorist attacks, "there seemed to be a new opening in the
United States' relationship with Mexico, and a possibility for re-examining
immigration and border safety policies." 88  Although the events of 9/11
quickly altered our national focus from immigration policies to fighting
terrorism, this relationship likely constitutes another reason why President
Bush will employ only incremental and virtually unnoticeable measures to
augment border security.
This opposition to augmented border security is not limited to our
neighbor to the south. Many Canadians have opposed the placement of
personnel on the northern border; this lack of support from our northern
neighbor also illustrates why our representatives fail to properly address this
issue. Recently, one Canadian forestry worker crossed the border to fuel up at
an American gas station without notifying American officials and was
arrested. 89 He had a rifle in the back of his truck. 90 Canadians were outraged,
reportedly labeling this incident as "yet another sign of American heavy-
handedness" with respect to border control, as border crossing at will had
been quietly and perpetually permitted to persist. 9' Our nation's politicians
are extremely concerned with international relations, as they should be, but
available at http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,25575,00.html ("Many politicians in the border
states do not want to risk alienating Mexican-Americans by backing tougher border security.").
84. The O'Reilly Factor: Republican Rep. Tom Tancredo Unwelcome at the White House?
(FOX News television broadcast, Nov. 26, 2002), available at
http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,71249,00.html [hereinafter O'Reilly: Tancredo Unwelcome at
the White House?].
85. Id.
86. MALKIN, supra note 3, at 62.
87. Diaz, Ramstad Urges Reinforced Borders, supra note 37.
88. Phares, Border Tightens, Relationship Chills, supra note 8 1.
89. Sarah Schweitzer, Border Arrest Fuels Canada Ire Over US Security, THE BOSTON GLOBE,
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most Americans would not deny the following fact: "It is [also absolutely]
essential that the U.S. government place the welfare of U.S. citizens above the
interests of non-citizens. 92
2. Economic Implications
Our nation's legislative and executive branches also abstain from plugging
our northern border because of economic concerns. As with any substantial
governmental security effort, the taxpayers will bear the burden of funding the
additional personnel and improved technological equipment. Millions of
Americans deem homeland security that of paramount importance and will
absolutely expend this money, but dissent will resound from those taxpayers
that have no desire to invest in insurance for our nation.
Additionally, the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)
encourages liberated trade between the North American countries, 93 and
Canada is the United States' number one trading partner, with nearly $1
billion of commerce passing between the countries each day.94  The
established crossing points at our northern and southern borders were nearly
brought to a standstill post-9/11 because of security concerns,95 thereby
harming the flow of commerce between the two countries. Some
commentators assert that increasing the number of border personnel would
further harm trade between the two countries.96 This argument is not
compelling because plugging the northern border at areas outside the border
checkpoints will serve only to hamper illegal trade between the United States
and Canada, including the transportation of drugs, arms, and people into our
nation-and if plugging the northern border hampers this form of commerce,
is this not something our politicians should advocate?
Another economic concern that rationalizes our representatives' failure to
avoid plugging our nation's borders is the economic repercussions for
businesses that employ illegal immigrants. Many businesses in our nation
rely on illegal immigrants to provide cheap labor, and especially during the
current economic downturn, many of these businesses could not survive if
forced to pay minimum wage to all workers. 97 This concern is a viable one in
terms of our nation's economic position, but when our representatives
92. Maddox, Military Needed to Enforce U.S. Border, supra note 74.
93. Schweitzer, Border Arrest, supra note 89, at A1.
94. Terrorism: Questions & Answers, supra note 30.
95. Phares, Border Tightens, Relationship Chills, supra note 81.
96. U.S. to Triple Guards, supra note 35; see also Gorman, A Nation Without Borders, supra
note 34 ("Congress has routinely shortchanged the Border Patrol ... because [it] create[s] friction in
a free-trade oriented system.").
97. Border Sieve, supra note 69.
[87:167
THE ROLE OF THE INVASION CLA USE POST-9/ 1
consider this fact when formulating their stance on border control, they are
doing all Americans a great injustice by advocating the employment of illegal
immigrants in generally harsh working conditions for little or no pay, thereby
exploiting these individuals. Thus, our nation's security interest
unquestionably must be balanced with its economic needs, but "[o]bviously, if
it's a choice between the two, security must come first.,
98
E. Border Militarization
The political opposition to border militarization is even more evident than
the opposition to plugging our borders with non-military border personnel.
This section will explore the issue of border militarization and highlight the
political response to the efforts of Colorado Representative Tom Tancredo,
one of the few politicians who avidly has promoted border militarization.
This section will also discuss the Posse Comitatus Act, a law that may hinder
border militarization efforts.
1. The Political Response to Border Militarization
Seventy-nine percent of Americans support the militarization of our
borders, 99 but the vast majority of our representatives will not advocate
military deployment to the border. 00 Unlike the majority of political issues,
this opposition to border militarization is not limited to party lines. Bill and
Hillary Clinton, Al Gore, and Ted Kennedy oppose this move, as do Newt
Gingrich, Jack Kemp, and Drug Czar John Walters.10 In contrast to our
representatives, groups of American citizens are so passionate about our lax
border policies that they have actually formed their own Border Patrol groups
98. Senate Hearing, supra note 6 (statement of Sen. Mike Dewine (D-OH)).
99. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
100. Despite the federal government's widespread opposition to border militarization, the dire
circumstances following the 9/11 attacks compelled the federal government to temporarily deploy
1600 National Guard troops to the Mexican and Canadian borders to aid with inspecting goods and
improving the flow of traffic at established crossing points. See Bradley Graham, Rumsfeld
Reconsiders Decision Not to Arm Troops at Border, THE WASH. POST, Mar. 28, 2002, at 6, LEXIS,
News Library. However, the government did its best to avoid any appearance of militarization: The
troops were not permitted to be armed, even though critics claimed that this placed unarmed troops in
dangerous situations. Id. Additionally, the government quickly made it known to the public that the
move was only temporary (the troops were stationed on the border only two to four months). See
James W. Crawley & Leonel Sanchez, National Guardsmen End Border-Crossing Duties Today,
THE SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., July 19, 2002, at B 1, LEXIS, News Library. Tom Ridge, Director of
Homeland Security, publicly noted that "the last thing we want to do is militarize the border between
friends." Maria Pe, Border Militarization is Temporary Measure, FIN. TIMES INFO., Feb. 28, 2002,
LEXIS, News Library.
101. O'Reilly: A Politician Who Supports Putting Troops on Our Borders, supra note 13.
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and volunteer their days and nights patrolling the border-while armed.10 2
This divergence between what Washington publicly advocates and what
citizens actually do epitomizes the difference in opinions with regard to the
militarization of our borders.
The callous treatment of one United States Congressman exemplifies why
many politicians will not publicly advocate the militarization of our borders.
Colorado Representative Tom Tancredo launched an initiative to militarize
the northern and southern borders. 10 3  He delivered approximately 30,000
petitions to the White House, urging the President to deploy military
personnel to the border, as an interim step, to enhance the federal agencies
that are engaged in border security; the petition resulted in an overload of the
White House email system. 0 4 Tancredo stated the following regarding this
public espousal of his initiative:
Perhaps the White House is finally getting the message .... It's about
time they realize that the people of this country justifiably feel that the
U.S. border is a sieve. It poses a real threat to our security and
ignoring this fact represents the most egregious evidence that the
federal gfovernment is shirking its responsibility to the people of this
nation.5
Representative Tancredo is one of the only politicians that has publicly
advocated border militarization, and he certainly is the most adamant.
Tancredo has overtly avowed that President Bush's open-door policy is
politically motivated, leaving the country highly vulnerable to another
terrorist attack as a result. 0 6  Referring to the average citizen's stance on
border militarization, he has accused the President of being "out of step with
the majority of Americans."' 07  Additionally, Tancredo controversially
asserted that if a terrorist illegally entered the United States through its
borders and perpetrated another terrorist attack, the blood of those killed
102. lgnacio Ibarra, Probe of 'Militias' is Sought, ARIz. DAILY STAR, Nov. 24, 2002, available
at http://www.azstarnet.com/border/21124militia.html. Similarly, numerous citizens have contacted
Representative Tancredo and informed him of their willingness to do the same. The 0 'Reilly Factor:
Continuing Chaos on the Border (FOX News television broadcast, June 20, 2002), available at
http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,55840,00.html [hereinafter O'Reilly: Continuing Chaos on the
Border].
103. O'Reilly: Continuing Chaos on the Border, supra note 102.
104. Tancredo, Congressional Immigration Reform Caucus Call on President to Enhance
Border Security, at http://www.house.gov/tancredo/Immigration/ (Oct. 8, 2002).
105. Id.
106. Sprengelmeyer, Tancredo Assails Bush Policy, supra note 83.
107. The statistics support Tancredo's assertion. See supra Part I1.
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would be on the hands of Congress and the President.1
0 8
After this controversial statement was made public, top Bush adviser Karl
Rove informed Tancredo that he was unwelcome at the White House
Christmas Party and warned Tancredo never again to "darken the doorstep of
the White House."' 1 9 Hispanic groups have labeled Tancredo's statements as
"close to being racist."" 0  Additionally, both political parties have criticized
Tancredo for his public disagreement with the President; as one commentator
asserted: "He seems to have little concern with advancing within the
Republican Party or ingratiating himself with a Republican president ... [and
his statements] will certainly complicate the president's efforts to improve the
Republican Party's standing with Hispanics and Asian-Americans.""' Thus,
the ostracism that has been bestowed upon Representative Tancredo illustrates
exactly why more politicians will not advocate border militarization and
publicly transgress the President's stance on lax border control policies.
In contrast to Representative Tancredo's proactive approach to border
militarization, other representatives have asserted a number of unconvincing,
and sometimes virtually nonsensical, rationales as to why our borders should
not be militarized. Texas Congressman Ciro Rodriguez maintained that the
border should not be militarized because "there's no chaos on the border"; but
when confronted with the fact that more than a million illegal aliens cross the
southern border every year, and these aliens cost our country $24 billion, he
simply opined that the military would not help this problem anyway."
2
Another Texas politician, Representative Silvestre Reyes, asserted two
negative implications that would result from border militarization: "First it
affects our troops and their readiness. Secondly, it gives the border
communities the equivalent of martial law to contend with." ''  Edward
Emanuel, the chairman of the Tohono O'Odham Indian Nation, opposes the
militarization of the border based on the "liability" involved "because we
108. O 'Reilly: Tancredo Unwelcome at the White House?, supra note 84.
109. Id.
110. Francisco Miraval, Hispanic Group Launches Campaign Against Colorado Rep.
Tancredo, FIN. TIMES INFO., May 8, 2002, LEXIS, News Library; see also Sprengelmeyer, Tancredo
Assails Bush Policy, supra note 83.
111. Sprengelmeyer, Tancredo Assails Bush Policy, supra note 83.
112. O'Reilly: Continuing Chaos on the Border, supra note 102. Additionally, one
commentator opposes militarization because, "[a]t best, an active armed presence would reduce but
not eliminate those determined to enter the country illegally." Wes Hasden, In Search of Safer
Borders, CHATTANOOGA TIMES/CHATTANOOGA FREE PRESS, June 20, 2002, at B6, LEXIS, News
Library [hereinafter Hasden, In Search of Safer Borders]. This point may be valid, but certainly this
argument does not mean that our current political lethargy is the superior approach.
113. Wendell Goler, Bush Signs Law Enhancing Border Security, at
http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,52772,00.html (May 15, 2002).
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have drug smugglers that are armed with machine guns."' 14 Incredibly, Mr.
Emanuel's statement implies that governmental apathy in the face of
dangerous chaos is the superior solution. Other commentators allege that the
militarization of the border would hamper trade between Canada and
Mexico,' 15 but this argument fails if the military is placed only in the areas
where it is most needed-in the vast territory between established crossing
points.
2. The Posse Comitatus Act: A Possible Bar to Border Militarization
Although these arguments advanced by our representatives in opposition
to border militarization are ineffectual at best, most representatives and
commentators would strongly enhance their arguments by acknowledging a
law that may not legally permit militarization of the border. The 1878 Posse
Comitatus Act was enacted in response to the use of troops in the southern
states after the Civil War to assist with enforcement of the 1867
Reconstruction Act." 6 The Act provides as follows:
Whoever, except in cases and under circumstances expressly
authorized by the Constitution or Act of Congress, willfully uses any
part of the Army or the Air Force as a posse comitatus or otherwise to
execute the laws shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not
mor[e] than two years, or both."I7
The Posse Comitatus Act "prohibits the use of the military to execute the
civil laws of the United States." ' 1 8 The Act is inapplicable to the Reserves
and the State National Guard when the members are not on active federal
duty, and it does not apply to the Coast Guard." 9 Additionally, a number of
exceptions to this Act exist: The Secretary of Defense may assist the
Department of Justice in an emergency situation if nuclear material is
involved, and the Act does not prohibit the President from using the military
in civil emergencies. 120  Currently, there is "considerable confusion both in
114. The O'Reilly Factor: Back of the Book Interview With Richard Saunders, Edward
Emanuel (FOX News television broadcast, Oct. 9, 2002), LEXIS, News Library.
115. See, e.g., Diaz, Ramstad Urges Reinforced Borders, supra note 37; Hasden, In Search of
Safer Borders, supra note 112.
116. Jeffrey Addicott, Drafting the Military: The Posse Comitatus Act and the Hunt for the DC
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the public and among lawmakers about what this law actually says and
whether any changes in it might be warranted."' 21 Amid calls for revisiting
and defining the Act during the War on Terror, the Bush administration will
reportedly review and attempt to define the scope of the Act.' 22  Thus,
although the majority of our representatives fail to advocate border
militarization despite public predilection, and they tend to exert unconvincing
arguments to explain their opposition, a valid argument may be asserted that,
at present, the militarization of our border is not permitted under the Posse
Comitatus Act.
In conclusion, the federal government's efforts since 9/11 to improve
border security between established crossing points fail to sufficiently protect
the states from a future terrorist invasion. The federal government has failed
to augment border security despite public support for this action, and the
members of the federal government especially have avoided the controversial
issue of border militarization. In all likelihood, the federal government's
political concerns dictate that this governmental apathy with respect to the
issue of border security will persist. Thus, because the federal government's
border control policies leave the states unprotected from a terrorist invasion,
the federal government's inaction likely violates a constitutional mandate:
The Invasion Clause.
III. THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY, JUSTICIABILITY, AND CONSTITUTIONAL
ENFORCEMENT
In transgression of the constitutional provision known as the Invasion
Clause, the legislative and executive branches will not conclusively employ
sufficient border security measures, and they fail to protect the states from a
future terrorist invasion. If Americans are to be protected from terrorist
invasion, the only branch of the federal government left to mandate
121. Joseph D'Agostino, Will Military Enforce Domestic Law?, at
http://www.worldnetdaily.com/news/article.asp?ARTICLEID=28433 (July 29, 2002) [hereinafter
D'Agostino, Will Military Enforce Domestic Law?]. In 6 U.S.C.S § 466 (Law. Co-op. 2002),
Congress recently reaffirmed the importance and applicability of this Act. However, although the
law exists, it may not always have been adhered to, thereby furthering the confusion surrounding this
law. Presidents Nixon and Reagan deployed military forces to replace striking employees. Id The
National Guard has been deployed during riots, to secure airports, and during the desegregation of
the South. The Big Story with John Gibson: Interview with Jim Bunning (FOX News television
broadcast, July 16, 2002), LEXIS, News Library. Some commentators asserted that the deployment
of National Guard troops to aid the Border Patrol post-9/1 1 violated the Act, see supra note 100, but
this argument likely is without merit because the troops did not carry weapons and were not directly
used for domestic law enforcement purposes. All Things Considered: Controversy Over the Use of
National Guard Troops to Patrol the US Borders with Mexico and Canada (National Public Radio
broadcast, Mar. 13, 2002), LEXIS, News Library.
122. D'Agostino, Will Military Enforce Domestic Law?, supra note 121.
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governmental compliance with the Invasion Clause is the federal judiciary.
To begin the determination of whether the federal judiciary may reach the
merits of an Invasion Clause claim, the basic responsibilities of the federal
judiciary must be discussed. Additionally, because members of the federal
judiciary have dismissed as political questions the only cases in which the
Invasion Clause was litigated, 23 the modern scope of the political question
doctrine must be addressed to determine if the states' allegation that the
federal government has failed to protect them from a "terrorist invasion"
would similarly present a political question. First, this Part discusses the
fundamental obligation of the judiciary to interpret the Constitution and
enforce justiciable constitutional provisions. Second, this Part addresses the
means by which the constitutional structure serves to insulate the federal
judiciary from majoritarian and political pressures and why this insulation
renders the judiciary the preeminent branch to enforce controversial
constitutional provisions. Third, potential bars to the states' Invasion Clause
claim will be discussed; these potential bars include the doctrine of standing
and the political question doctrine.
A. Constitutional Interpretation and Enforcement
The Invasion Clause was included in the Constitution so the federal
government would protect the rights of the states and the individual
inhabitants of the states, and "the judiciary is clearly discernible as the
primary means through which these [constitutional] rights may be
enforced."' 124 Ever since Justice Marshall uttered the oft-cited words: "It is
emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to [s]ay what
the law is,,, 2 it has appeared that "it is the Supreme Court's province and
duty to answer all constitutional questions"'' 26 and that the judicial branch is
vested with the ultimate authority to determine the meaning of the
Constitution. 127 This authority is subject to a handful of limitations, such as
the political question doctrine and standing requirements, which will be
discussed in much more detail shortly. 128 Notwithstanding these exceptions, it
is the Court's duty to interpret the Constitution, enforce constitutional
123. See infra Part IV.B.
124. Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 241 (1979).
125. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
126. Rachel E. Barkow, More Supreme Than the Court? The Fall of the Political Question
Doctrine and the Rise of Judicial Supremacy, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 237, 239 (2002).
127. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, INTERPRETING THE CONSTITUTION 84 (1987) (citing United States
v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974)).
128. See infra Part III.C.
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rights,129 and resolve disputes.
30
Furthermore, the judiciary must not permit unconstitutional governmental
action to continue without intervention, as "the traditional responsibility of the
courts as the last guardians of the Constitution... point[s] to the propriety of
an active role for the judiciary in ensuring governmental compliance with the
law."' 13 1  As Professor Martin Redish maintained: "'The moral cost of
[permitting a manifest constitutional violation to continue], both to society in
general and to the Supreme Court in particular, far outweighs whatever
benefits are thought to derive from the judicial abdication of the review
function.""
132
Moreover, if the Court avoids an otherwise justiciable claim in deference
to the judgment of the legislative and executive branches, the Court
transgresses its role as the ultimate interpreter of the Constitution, as "laws
that are not subject to judicial enforcement are not laws at all."' 13 3 If the Court
refuses to enforce the Invasion Clause in deference to the political branches,
and the political branches refuse to comply with the Clause because of
political concerns, the judicial power is rendered a nullity' 34 and the
constitutional language becomes merely precatory. 135 This deference leaves
the nation in a "constitutional state of nature, in which the constitutional
position that prevails is the one that is the politically or physically most
powerful.' 36  Thus, the Court is obligated to interpret and enforce the
Constitution and resolve justiciable disputes.
129. Donald H. Zeigler, The New Activist Court, 45 AM. U. L. REV. 1367, 1382 (1996).
130. Michael J. Glennon, Foreign Affairs and the Political Question Doctrine, in FOREIGN
AFFAIRS AND THE U.S. CONSTITUTION 108 (Louis Henkin, Michael J. Glennon, & William D.
Rogers eds., 1990).
131. Id. at 107.
132. Id. at 110 (quoting Martin H. Redish, Judicial Review and the "Political Question," 79
Nw. U. L. REV. 1031, 1060(1984)).
133. Moses David Breuer, Note, Casting a Constitutional Controversy as a Nonjusticiable
Political Question: Made in the USA Foundation v. United States, 27 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 1029, 1062
(2002).
134. LoUis FISHER & NEAL DEVINS, POLITICAL DYNAMICS OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 68
(1992).
135. Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 242 (1979).
136. Martin H. Redish, Judicial Review and the "Political Question," 79 NW. U. L. REV. 103 1,
1050 (1984). Additionally, if the judiciary defers to the political branches to interpret and enforce a
constitutional provision, "the political branches that are accused of violating the Constitution are
allowed to judge the constitutionality of their own behavior. No check exists. Nor is there the
reasoned elaboration of the meaning of these constitutional provisions, something only the judiciary
provides." CHEMERINSKY, supra note 127, at 99.
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B. Insulation From Political and Majoritarian Pressures
Of the three branches of federal government, the federal judiciary is best
suited to enforce controversial constitutional provisions because the judiciary
is insulated from majoritarian and political pressures. Article III of the
Constitution grants federal judges life tenure and salary protection. 137 The
Framers granted federal judges life tenure "precisely so that they will not be
accountable to the people."'' 38 This non-accountability serves to insulate the
federal judiciary from maj oritarian pressures.
Similarly, the federal judiciary is the "authoritative interpreter of the
Constitution" because it "can best enforce the Constitution against the desires
of political majorities., ,1 39 The judiciary tends to be shielded from political
pressures 40 because, much unlike the executive and legislative branches,
federal judges never face reelection.' 41 The federal judiciary is best suited to
interpret the Constitution because its "primary commitment is to the
Constitution, not to gaining reelection."1 42 Therefore, "[i]f anything is clear
from the structure of the Constitution and the language of Article III," the
Constitution relieves the judiciary from political pressures to ensure the
federal judiciary's independence. 43  The modem Court is well suited to
interpret and enforce the Invasion Clause in the context of border security
because it can interpret the Constitution and formulate this determination
without worry of political conformance. Thus, the basic responsibility of the
judicial branch is to enforce constitutional provisions, and the Constitution
was structured to insulate courts from politics so they can render controversial
137. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1; see also Erwin Chemerinsky, Guaranteeing a Republican Form
of Government: Cases Under the Guarantee Clause Should be Justiciable, 65 U. COLO. L. REV. 849,
865 (1994) [hereinafter Chemerinsky, Guarantee Clause].
138. ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA 5 (1990); see also CHEMERINSKY, supra
note 127, at xi-xii ("[Ilt is desirable for society to have an institution such as the Court, which is not
popularly elected or accountable, to identify and protect values that it deems sufficiently important to
be constitutionalized and safeguarded from social majorities."); WILLIAM GANGI, SAVING THE
CONSTITUTION FROM THE COURTS 221 (1995) ("[S]ince judges have life-tenure and are insulated
from electoral accountability they are well suited to carrying out the Court's task."); Id. at 41 ("The
delegates ... consciously departed from the republican principle of elector accountability."). But see
Barkow, supra note 126, at 327 (positing that the political branches, as opposed to the federal
judiciary, should answer constitutional questions because the political branches are accountable to
the people).
139. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 127, at 86.
140. Id; see also id. at 89 (The judicial branch is "unique in that it is the only institution
committed to arriving at decisions based entirely on arguments and reasoning."). However, because
the judicial nomination procedures are inherently political, this shield from political pressure may
never be absolute.
141. Id. at 86.
142. Id. at 88.
143. Chemerinsky, Guarantee Clause, supra note 137, at 865.
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decisions without fear of political and majoritarian backlash. However, the
federal judiciary likely can reach the merits of an Invasion Clause claim only
if the claim does not present a political question.
C. Potential Bars to an Invasion Clause Claim: Standing and The Political
Question Doctrine
The Invasion Clause has been litigated in an extremely limited context. In
the only cases in which states have alleged a governmental violation of the
Invasion Clause, a number of states brought suit, asserting that illegal aliens
had invaded their states and that the federal government failed to protect them
from this, if you will, "alien invasion." The states sought reimbursement from
the federal government for monies expended on illegal aliens. In all of these
cases, the courts found that the issue presented a nonjusticiable, political
question pursuant to the Supreme Court's holding in Baker v. Carr.144 These
Invasion Clause cases will be discussed in detail in the subsequent Part.145
Because the prior Invasion Clause claims were dismissed as nonjusticiable
questions, the justiciability of the Invasion Clause will be the vanguard issue
if the states attempt to bring an Invasion Clause claim to the federal judiciary.
Thus, this Part will address in detail the scope and modem status of the
political question doctrine in the realm of foreign and domestic affairs.
Additionally, the doctrine of standing will be discussed.
1. The Doctrine of Standing
Although the crux of this Comment addresses the political question
doctrine and the justiciability of the Invasion Clause, the doctrine of standing
must also be discussed, as these two doctrines are inextricably interwoven.
Pursuant to the doctrine of standing, all courts must inquire "whether the
litigant is entitled to have the court decide the merits of the dispute or of
particular issues. 146 Standing has also been described as follows: "'[T]he
very first question that is sometimes rudely asked when one person complains
of another's actions: 'What's it to you?"'' 147 The doctrine of standing, similar
to the political question doctrine, is based on the concept of separation of
powers. 148
144. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
145. See infra Part IV.B.
146. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750-51 (1984).
147. Linda Sandstrom Simard, Standing Alone: Do We Still Need the Political Question
Doctrine?, 100 DICK. L. REv. 303, 308 (1996) (quoting Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as
an Essential Element of the Separation of Powers, 17 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 881, 882 (1983)).
148. Id. at 306; see also Allen, 468 U.S. at 750 ("Article III of the Constitution confines the
federal courts to adjudicating actual 'cases' and 'controversies."').
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The Supreme Court in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife149 explained the
constitutional components of the modem standing doctrine. The Court stated
as follows:
Over the years, our cases have established that the irreducible
constitutional minimum of standing contains three elements. First, the
plaintiff must have suffered an "injury in fact"-an invasion of a
legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized, and
(b) "actual or imminent, not 'conjectural' or 'hypothetical .... "'
Second, there must be a causal connection between the injury and the
conduct complained of-the injury has to be "fairly ... trace[able] to
the challenged action of the defendant, and not ... th[e] result [of] the
independent action of some third party not before the court." Third, it
must be "likely," as opposed to merely "speculative," that the injury
will be "redressed by a favorable decision.
' '15°
In addition to the constitutional components of the modem standing
doctrine, the doctrine is comprised of prudential components, which have
been described as follows:
First, the Court has required that the injury be within the "zone of
interest" to be protected by the Constitution or statute. Second, the
Court has often refused to adjudicate claims on behalf of third parties
not before the Court. Finally, . . . the Court has rejected cases that
allege "generalized grievances," injuries that are not peculiar to an
individual or a small body of people, even when the "technical"
injury-in-fact specification is satisfied.15'
Thus, although the crux of this Comment addresses the justiciability of the
Invasion Clause, the states must also prove that they have standing to assert
the claim that the federal government's lax border control policies violate the
Invasion Clause. 
52
2. "Is There a 'Political Question' Doctrine?"'' 53
In this section, the historical underpinnings of the political question
149. 504 U.S. 555 (1992).
150. Id. at 560-61 (alterations in original) (internal citations omitted).
151. Theodore Y. Blumoff, Judicial Review, Foreign Affairs, and Legislative Standing, 25 GA.
L. REv. 227, 310 (1992).
152. The doctrine of standing will be applied to the facts of the present Invasion Clause
analysis in Part V.A.
153. Louis Henkin, Is There a "Political Question" Doctrine?, 85 YALE L.J. 597 (1976).
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doctrine will be explored. Additionally, the modem scope of the political
question doctrine will be discussed.
a. Baker v. Carr and the Political Question Doctrine
The historical underpinnings of the political question doctrine lie with the
Court's decision in Marbury v. Madison, in which Justice Marshall opined:
'"Questions, in their nature political, or which are, by the constitution and
laws, submitted to the executive, can never be made in this court." ' 54  This
classical form of the political question doctrine is grounded in the
Constitution,' 55 but the doctrine has evolved to include prudential components
as well as constitutional components. 156  The political question doctrine is
derived from the concept of "separation of powers."' 157  Pursuant to the
political question doctrine, "certain allegations of constitutional violations are
not to be adjudicated by the federal judiciary even though all of the
jurisdictional and other justiciability requirements are met.' 58 If the political
question doctrine is applicable, the federal court rules that it cannot hear the
claim that a constitutional violation has occurred, and it defers the question
for resolve through the political process. 59
With its holding in Baker v. Carr,160 the United States Supreme Court
pioneered a framework pursuant to which courts may determine whether a
case or controversy presents a nonjusticiable, and thus political, question. The
Court's decision in Baker v. Carr included the Court's "most detailed
discussion of the political question doctrine to date."' 16' When the Baker
decision was handed down, it was understood that the "application of the
Baker 'formulations' through 'discriminating inquiry' would narrow the scope
of the political question doctrine.' 62
154. Barkow, supra note 126, at 248 (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137, 170
(1803)).
155. Id. at 247-48.
156. Id. at 253 ("[T]he prudential political question doctrine is not anchored in an interpretation
of the Constitution itself, but is instead a judge-made overlay that courts have used at their discretion
to protect their legitimacy and to avoid conflict with the political branches.").
157. Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Justiciability and Separation of Powers: A Neo-Federalist
Approach, 81 CORNELL L. REv. 393, 497 (1996).
158. Chemerinsky, Guarantee Clause, supra note 137, at 852-53.
159. Id. at 853; see also Scott Birkey, Note, Gordon v. Texas and the Prudential Approach to
Political Questions, 87 CAL. L. REv. 1265, 1266 (1999) ("[T]he doctrine in its entirety dictates that
courts should refrain from adjudicating nonjusticiable political questions from both a prudential and a
constitutional perspective.").
160. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
161. Barkow, supra note 126, at 264.
162. Robert F. Nagel, Political Law, Legalistic Politics: A Recent History of the Political
Question Doctrine, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 643, 646 (1989) (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 220
2003]
MARQUETTE LA W REVIEW
In Baker, Tennessee residents challenged a state statute that based the
apportionment of voting districts on a 1901 census. 163 The plaintiffs sought a
declaration that the reapportionment statute was unconstitutional because the
statute "debase[d]... their votes" and denied them their right to equal
protection pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment.164 The issue before the
Court was whether the claim presented a nonjusticiable, political question.165
To illuminate the components of the political question doctrine, Justice
Brennan, writing for the majority, discussed a number of attributes of the
doctrine; 166 four of the attributes most relevant to the present analysis are as
follows. First, the determination of justiciability "is primarily a function of
the separation of powers."' 67 Second, "'[i]n determining whether a question
falls within [the political question] category, the appropriateness under our
system of government of attributing finality to the action of the political
departments and also the lack of satisfactory criteria for a judicial
determination are dominant considerations."", 168 Third, because the Court is
the "ultimate interpreter of the Constitution," the Court is vested with the
power to decide whether the Constitution commits a matter to another branch
of government. 69 Fourth, the political question doctrine is implicated only
when there exists a relationship between the judiciary and the other branches
of the federal government, but the doctrine is not implicated when there is a
relationship between the federal judiciary and the states. 70
After scrutinizing several cases in which courts had utilized various forms
of the political question doctrine to articulate their jurisdictional decisions, the
Court combined a number of considerations underlying these decisions,
thereby formulating the political question doctrine. Applying this doctrine to
the facts of the case before it, the Court held that the case presented a non-
political, justiciable claim, and the equal protection challenge could
proceed.' 7 1 The Baker v. Carr Court's oft-quoted components of the political
(1962)).
163. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 187 (1962). This statute allocated legislative representation
based on the total number of qualified voters within the counties. Id. at 189. Between the time of the
census and the time the case reached the Supreme Court, Tennessee's population had grown
exponentially and was substantially redistributed; this growth resulted in a "shifted and enlarged
voting population." Id. at 192.
164. Id. at 194.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 210.
167. Id.
168. Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 454-55 (1939)).
169. Id. at211.
170. Id. at 210.
171. Id. at 226.
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question doctrine are as follows:
Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political
question is found a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment
of the issue to a coordinate political department; or a lack of judicially
discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; or the
impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a
kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or the impossibility of a court's
undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the
respect due coordinate branches of government; or an unusual need
for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made; or
the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements
by various departments on one question. 17
2
The Baker decision codified the constitutional'and prudential components
of the political question doctrine into judge-made law. The first and second
components of the Baker Court's test are the constitutional components, and
the third through sixth components are the prudential components. 173 Courts
must not and often will not apply each of the Baker criteria to the facts of their
cases. 174 If a court opts to focus only on the constitutional components, it
"will tend to focus its attention on whether a conflict exists between the
federal judiciary and other branches of the federal government. 175
Conversely, if a court focuses on the prudential components, it "will tend to
examine the issue presented with an eye toward judicial manageability.' 76
The prudential components function to conserve judicial resources and
impede courts from deciding matters outside of their expertise. 1
77
b. The Modern Scope of the Political Question Doctrine
In the forty years following Baker v. Carr, the modern scope of the
political question doctrine has resulted in a great deal of scholarly comment.
172. Id. at217.
173. Barkow, supra note 126, at 265; see also Birkey, supra note 159, at 1265 ("Many scholars
recognize both prudential and constitutional aspects of the political question doctrine.").
174. Although the Baker Court sets forth numerous factors to determine whether a claim
presents a political question, "only two, lack of clear standards for judicial determination and the
need to attribute finality to coordinate branch decisions, have been consistently and coherently
articulated by the courts." Linda Champlin & Alan Schwarz, Political Question Doctrine and
Allocation of the Foreign Affairs Power, 13 HOFSTRA L. REv. 215, 219 (1985).
175. Birkey, supra note 159, at 1276.
176. Id. at 1277.
177. Id. at 1265. One notable scholar, Alexander Bickel, has viewed the political question
doctrine as "more prudentially limiting than constitutionally limiting." Id. at 1273.
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As discussed in this section, this commentary has resulted because the Court
has rarely applied the political question doctrine to questions that appear to be
political. Much disagreement has arisen among commentators with respect to
the political question doctrine, as they disagree about the doctrine's wisdom,
validity, scope, rationale, and very existence. 78 Moreover, quite frequently,
commentators have advocated the stance that the political question doctrine
"ought at last ... to be made to go away."' 179
A number of scholars and commentators have posited that the political
question doctrine in its modem form should be abandoned. Professor Louis
Henkin advocates the position that "all the political question cases can be read
as instances of constitutional interpretation."'' 80  Professor Martin Redish
maintains that the political question doctrine should be abandoned.' 8' He
believes that the doctrine should play no role once it is recognized that
judicial review is legitimate 82 "[b]ecause constitutional law is obviously and
inescapably political.' 83  Redish acknowledges, however, that the federal
judiciary should defer to the political branches in cases in which there is a
constitutional textual commitment of a power to a political branch, but the
Constitution fails to identify how this power must be exercised. 84 Professor
Erwin Chemerinsky advocates judicial deference to the political branches
"only in areas where there is reason to believe that the judiciary is
substantially less able than other branches of the federal government to
interpret and enforce a constitutional provision. '' 85
In opposition to these views, Dean Choper advocates the notion that the
judicial branch should "abstain from cases involving the Constitution's
structure (e.g., separation of powers) and instead conserve its resources for
protecting individual rights."' 86 Additionally, one commentator asserts two
rationales to support the conclusion that it is imprudent to reject the political
question doctrine in its entirety. 8 7 First, the political branches would not be
able to exercise constitutional judgment in true political question cases, and
178. Nagel, supra note 162, at 654.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Pushaw, supra note 157, at 502.
182. Redish, supra note 136, at 1059-60.
183. Nagel, supra note 162, at 657.
184. Pushaw, supra note 157, at 502.
185. Chemerinsky, Guarantee Clause, supra note 137, at 852.
186. Pushaw, supra note 157, at 502. One commentator believes this view should be rejected,
as "[t]he Constitution's structure preserves liberty every bit as much as its provisions guaranteeing
individual rights." Id.
187. Barkow, supra note 126, at 334-35.
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second, the Court would be left to police the boundaries of its power.188
Post-Baker, the Court has done little to resolve this confusion surrounding
the scope and/or existence of the political question doctrine. From the time of
Baker v. Carr to the present-a span of forty years---"a majority of the Court
has found only two issues to present political questions, and both involved
strong textual anchors for finding that the constitutional decision rested with
the political branches."' 89 In more than a dozen cases, the Court expressly
rejected the application of the political question doctrine.' 90
The two cases in which the Court held that the political question doctrine
barred judicial resolution were Gilligan v. Morgan'91 and Nixon v. United
States.192  In Gilligan, the Court held that the question of whether the
government's alleged negligence in training National Guard members caused
the death of several student protestors at Kent State University presented a
political question.' 93 The Court neglected to hear the claim for two reasons: It
did not believe it was competent to regulate the National Guard's jurisdiction,
and there existed a constitutional textual commitment to Congress of the
ability to organize, arm, and discipline the Militia. 1
94
After Gilligan, twenty years passed before a majority of the Court found
that another case presented a political question. 95 In Nixon v. United States,
the Court held that the issue of whether the Senate could impeach a federal
judge presented a political question. 96 Similar to the textual commitment in
Gilligan, the Constitution grants the Senate the "sole" power "to determine
what the Constitution means by the 'tr[ial]' of impeachments," so the Court
deferred the issue for congressional resolution. 197 Thus, the existence of the
political question doctrine has been frequently questioned because in the forty
188. Id.
189. Id. at 268. Although a majority of the Court has found only two cases to present political
questions, a plurality of the Court in Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 109 (1986), found that the issue
as to whether the President possessed unilateral authority to terminate a treaty presented a political
question. See Nagel, supra note 162, at 649. Additionally, although the Supreme Court has shied
from applying the political question doctrine since its decision in Baker, lower courts continue to
apply the Baker analysis in determining whether to reach the merits of a case. David J. Bederman,
Deference or Deception: Treaty Rights as Political Questions, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 1439, 1442
(1999). This Comment, however, will focus on the relationship between the Supreme Court and the
political question doctrine.
190. Sandstrom Simard, supra note 147, at 305.
191. 413 U.S. 1 (1973).
192. 506 U.S. 224 (1993).
193. Barkow, supra note 126, at 270.
194. Id.
195. Id. at 271.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 272 (alteration in original).
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years following the Baker decision, the Court repeatedly has failed to defer to
the political branches by means of the political question doctrine. The Court's
disregard of the doctrine has led time and time again to the now infamous
question: "Is there a 'political question' doctrine?"''
98
As the infrequent application of the Baker criteria demonstrates, the
political question doctrine has become largely incomprehensible to the
Court, 199 and "it has come to seem altogether normal that federal courts
should resolve issues that have no distinctively legal quality and that the
judicial function should be thought of as political conversation., 20 0 With its
fairly recent decision in New York v. United States,20 1 the Court even hinted at
its willingness to abrogate its extremely long-standing bar on reaching the
merits of Guarantee Clause claims, stating that "perhaps not all claims under
the Guarantee Clause present nonjusticiable political questions., 202
Consequently, the Court's recent decisions illustrate that judicial review has
risen out of the ashes, and there is "no place in it for an exemption for
uncertain 'political questions.'
20 3
Similarly, because constitutional cases or controversies tend to be
inherently political, and "the Constitution requires the Supreme Court and the
lower federal courts to decide any number of 'political' questions as a matter
of course," the politicization of the federal judiciary comes as no surprise to
many. 204 The fact that the federal judiciary often chooses to answer political
questions "challenges the notion.., that they cannot decide them. ''20 5 Thus,
the fall of the political question doctrine could lead to judicial resolution of
most (if not all) domestic cases or controversies-including a determination
by the Rehnquist Court as to whether the federal government's border
protection policies comply with the Invasion Clause.
3. The Political Question Doctrine in the Realm of Foreign Affairs
The political question doctrine seems to have all but disappeared in the
majority of the Court's recent precedent, but the disappearance of the political
question doctrine may not be absolute. Although the Rehnquist Court is
198. See Henkin, supra note 153, at 597.
199. Nagel, supra note 162, at 668.
200. Id.
201. 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
202. Id. at 185.
203. Sandstrom Simard, supra note 147, at 303. Moreover, the notion that judicial deference is
proper in cases of political questions has become antiquated, and the political question doctrine has
fallen into the shadow ofjudicial supremacy. Barkow, supra note 126, at 240.
204. Barkow, supra note 126, at 244.
205. THOMAS M. FRANCK, POLITICAL QUESTIONS/JUDICIAL ANSWERS 61 (1992).
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extremely unlikely to examine the political question doctrine in the context of
a domestic case or controversy, 20 6 "in the area of foreign affairs, the judiciary
has traditionally practiced great restraint vis-A-vis the political branches.
20 7
Although the modem Court is more likely than Courts of the past to find that
a foreign affairs question does not present a political question, many
commentators believe that the political question doctrine is thriving in the
realm of foreign affairs.20 8
Even though the Constitution grants the federal judiciary some power over
foreign affairs, the judiciary has historically employed a laissez faire approach
to foreign affairs cases or controversies.20 9 Justice Marshall authored the
language constituting "the touchstone of the political question doctrine and its
use in foreign affairs matters" 210 when he noted that "'[t]he acts of [the
President], as an officer, can never be examinable by the courts.' ' 211 It must
be kept in mind, however, that this statement is dicta212 and does not exclude
all foreign relations questions from the judiciary.213 Additionally, the Baker
Court included in its discussion of the political question doctrine this
declaration: "[I]t is error to suppose that every case or controversy which
,,214 sttmntouches foreign relations lies beyond judicial cognizance. This statement
explicitly illustrates the Court's inclination to avoid a bright-line
characterization of foreign relations questions as political questions. 1 5
Three key reasons have been advanced to rationalize judicial deference of
foreign affairs questions to the political branches. First, because of the nature
of foreign controversies, all branches of the federal government must display
206. For a discussion addressing the difference between foreign and domestic affairs and the
role of the courts, see United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319 (1936) and
Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1(1831).
207. Breuer, supra note 133, at 1030; see also FRANCK, supra note 205, at 4 ("Carried to its
logical extreme, this doctrine holds that the political authorities are suit-proof as long as they purport
to act in pursuance of their 'foreign-affairs' power.").
208. Champlin & Schwarz, supra note 174, at 217.
209. Judy Wurtzel, First Amendment Limitations on the Exclusion of A liens, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV.
149, 180 (1987) ("Article III, section 2 gives the federal judiciary the authority to determine
international law and to adjudicate cases arising under treaties and cases in which foreign states or
citizens are parties.").
210. Bederman, supra note 189, at 1441 (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137
(1803)).
211. Michael E. Tigar, The "Political Question Doctrine - and Foreign Relations, 17 UCLA L.
REV. 1135, 1168 (1970).
212. Bederman, supra note 189, at 1441.
213. Tigar, supra note 211, at 1168 ("A close reading of this statement reveals that it does not
purport to exclude all questions of foreign relations from judicial cognizance, but only certain
functions of the Secretary of State.").
214. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211 (1962).
215. Wurtzel, supra note 209, at 186.
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a sense of uniformity. 216 Second, a court's ability to define an undefined term
217may be especially limited in the context of a foreign affairs dispute. Third,
218although disputed, an arguable textual commitment to Congress and the
President exists with many matters touching on foreign affairs.21 9
Post-Baker, the Supreme Court has dismissed several dozen foreign
relations cases on account of the political question doctrine, 220 and it is
especially likely to do so when the dispute can best be resolved between
Congress and the President.221 Moreover, as can be gleaned from the prior
line of "alien invasion" cases in which the Invasion Clause was implicated,
the federal judiciary has been particularly willing to defer to Congress's
judgment when questions regarding illegal aliens have been presented, even
though this issue "cannot be thought among the most urgent of foreign-policy
concerns."2 22 Thus, the political question doctrine as a whole has fallen into
disuse, but the modem Court may find that a question touching on foreign
affairs presents a nonjusticiable question.
Conversely, although many contend that the political question doctrine is
alive and well in the context of foreign relations questions, others have
concluded that this area of law suffers from "jurisprudential chaos. 223 The
Court's dismissals of foreign affairs questions pursuant to the political
question doctrine "are matched by dozens of other cases that have a
significant foreign relations quotient, but are nonetheless adjudicated on the
216. Breuer, supra note 133, at 1046.
217. Id. at 1056.
218. FRANCK, supra note 205, at 91 ("'[T]he Constitution is largely silent on the question of
allocation of powers associated with foreign affairs and national security."' (quoting United States v.
Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 567 F.2d 121, 128 (D.C. Cir. 1977))).
219. Arguably, the Constitution vests the President with the powers "'to make treaties and
appoint Ambassadors."' Id. (quoting United States v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 567 F.2d 121, 128 (D.C.
Cir. 1977)). Additionally, Congress's powers over foreign affairs issues may consist of the
following: "'[T]he powers to declare war, raise and support armed forces and, in the case of the
Senate, consent to treaties and the appointment of Ambassadors."' Id. (quoting United States v. Am.
Tel. & Tel. Co., 567 F.2d 121, 128 (D.C. Cir. 1977)).
220. Jack L. Goldsmith, Separation of Powers in Foreign Affairs: The New Formalism in
United States Foreign Relations Law, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 1395, 1403 (1999).
221. Id. at 1403.
222. FRANCK, supra note 205, at 54; see also Nagel, supra note 162, at 643. For a discussion
of the "alien invasion" cases, see infra Part IV.B.
223. Goldsmith, supra note 220, at 1403. This chaos is heightened when judges "say they will
abstain but fail to do so; judges proclaim the separation of powers but almost always decide in favor
of the government in a process where the players. . appear not to be playing on a level field."
FRANCK, supra note 205, at 30; see also Jonathan I. Charney, Judicial Deference in Foreign
Relations, in FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE U.S. CONSTITUTION 98 (Louis Henkin, Michael J.
Glennon, & William D. Rogers eds., 1990); Henkin, supra note 153, at 612.
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merits, often without discussion of the political question doctrine., 224  The
Court has reached the merits of cases touching on foreign relations, including
cases involving the use of the treaty power and the constitutionality of the
President's use of executive agreements, even though these cases had foreign
overtones.225 Moreover, the Court has rendered decisions that may adversely
affect foreign relations,226 and the Court has not hesitated to adjudicate certain
cases with foreign relations and national security overtones without mention
of the political question doctrine. This "jurisprudential chaos" even extends
to cases involving illegal aliens, as courts have adjudicated these cases
without even discussing the political question doctrine.227
Similar to scholarly commentary advocating the abandonment of the
political question doctrine, the criticisms of the doctrine have extended to the
judiciary's application of the doctrine in the realm of foreign affairs. Many
commentators believe it is alien to our nation's judicial system to assume that
only the executive branch has the tools to make decisions regarding our
national security2 28 and that unbridled judicial deference is cause for
concern. 229 As our nation becomes more globally interdependent, the majority
of judicial determinations will affect foreign affairs, 230 and if the judiciary
abstains from hearing all these cases, the judicial power may be rendered a
nullity.23' Additionally, many believe that foreign relations questions present
no more difficult questions than do "antitrust, securities, and family law
224. Goldsmith, supra note 220, at 1403.
225. Chemerinsky, Guarantee Clause, supra note 137, at 856; see also Bederman, supra note
189, at 1444-45. But see id. at 1470 (positing that a possible resurrection of the political question bar
in adjudicating treaty rights has occurred within the federal judiciary).
226. Goldsmith, supra note 220, at 1398 ("Federal courts... do this, for example, when they
apply a federal statute extraterritorially, or interpret a treaty, or adjudicate the validity of a foreign act
of state."). For an example of a decision in which the Court reached the merits of a case that
impacted foreign relations, see Japan Whaling Ass 'n v. American Cetacean Society, 478 U.S. 221
(1986).
227. FRANCK, supra note 205, at 85; see also Norman Dorsen, Foreign Affairs and Civil
Liberties, 83 AM. J. INT'L L. 840, 845 (1989).
228. FRANCK, supra note 205, at 5; see also id. at 7 ("Judges are much better suited than is
sometimes alleged to make decisions incidentally affecting foreign relations and national security.").
Additionally, the political branches have deferred to the judiciary in recent years to resolve questions
of sovereign immunity, which illustrates that "the president and Congress do not take for granted that
judicial reticence in foreign-affairs and national-security matters invariably advances the national
interest." Id. at 97.
229. Bederman, supra note 189, at 1440. Conversely, if the judiciary does not defer to
Congress on account of the political question doctrine, a greater likelihood exists that Congress will
disregard a court's holding. See Redish, supra note 136, at 1053.
230. Goldsmith, supra note 220, at 1413.
231. FISHER & DEVINS, supra note 134, at 68.
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controversies that raise complex economic and psychological issues. 232
Moreover, the Supreme Court itself has acknowledged that the "existence
of 'foreign commitments' could not relieve the government of its obligation to
'operate within the bounds laid down by the Constitution.' ' 233  The
Constitution does not allocate sole power over foreign affairs to the political
branches, and the Constitution contains no language prohibiting courts from
rendering decisions that affect foreign affairs.234 Additionally, the Court's
basic function is to safeguard individual rights, and there is nothing to suggest
that the rights of individuals differ between domestic and foreign relations
questions. 235 Therefore, although some courts have chosen to defer foreign
affairs questions to the political branches under the pretense of the political
question doctrine, the actions of other courts significantly differ when they
fail to acknowledge the existence of the political question doctrine in a foreign
affairs case, and many commentators support the latter courts' actions in so
doing.
IV. "ALIEN INVASION": THE FEDERAL COURTS' LIMITED ENCOUNTER WITH
THE INVASION CLAUSE
This Part will address the scope of the Invasion Clause and the past cases
in which the states alleged that the federal government violated the Invasion
Clause because it failed to adequately enforce immigration regulations. First,
historical commentary on the purpose and scope of the Invasion Clause will
be provided. Second, Invasion Clause precedent will be discussed and
analyzed.
A. Historical Commentary on the Invasion Clause
Since its inclusion in the Constitution, the Invasion Clause has rarely
arisen as a topic of commentary; this lack of commentary is likely attributable
to the fact that our mainland soil has never been attacked in the manner in
which it was on 9/11. James Madison provided the most detailed discussion
of the Clause in The Federalist No. 43. The relevant commentary is as
follows:
A protection against invasion is due from every society to the parts
composing it. The latitude of the expression here used seems to
232. Dorsen, supra note 227, at 844.
233. Breuer, supra note 133, at 1053 (quoting Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 14, 17 (1957)).
234. Chamey, supra note 223, at 99.
235. Id. at 100 ("[M]atters with foreign relations implications may involve the legal rights and
duties of individuals or the states under federal law clearly within the courts' authority.").
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secure each State, not only against foreign hostility, but against
ambitious or vindictive enterprises of its more powerful neighbors.
The history, both of ancient and modem confederacies, proves that the
weaker members of the union ought not to be insensible to the policy
of this article.236
Thus, the Invasion Clause was included in the United States Constitution
so the federal government would protect the states, or the "weaker members
of the union," if subject to foreign or domestic hostility. Neither the
Constitution nor the Framers specified whether the "invasion" must be
perpetrated by a recognized foreign entity (such as a foreign state or country),
or whether a terrorist attack perpetrated by foreign citizens would constitute a
sufficient "invasion." However, this determination is likely inconsequential
because it appears that the term "invasion" can be interpreted to refer to any
hostile and foreign invasion perpetrated on American soil.
Moreover, that the Framers intended the "invasion" to be a hostile one is
supported on two fronts. First, the Framers correspondingly utilized the word
"invasion" to refer to a hostile invasion in Article I, Section 9, Clause 2 of the
Constitution.237 Second, defining an "invasion" as a hostile invasion is
consistent with the Eighteenth Century understanding of this definition.238 In
his Dictionary of the English Language, "Dr. [Samuel] Johnson defined
'invasion' as a '[h]ostile entrance upon the rights or possessions of another;
hostile encroachment.' . . . Similarly, Dr. Johnson's primary definition of
'invade' is '[t]o attack a country; to make an hostile entrance.' '239 Thus, the
Invasion Clause was included in the Constitution so the federal government
would protect the states if the states had been and/or likely would be subject
to a hostile, foreign invasion.
B. Invasion Clause Precedent
The lower courts have applied the Baker standard in determining whether
a state's Invasion Clause claim against the federal government may proceed.
In these prior Invasion Clause cases, numerous states asserted that they had
236. THE FEDERALIST No. 43, at 298 (James Madison) (Tudor Publishing Co. 1947).
237. On Petition For a Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals For the Ninth
Circuit, Brief For the Respondents in Opposition at 10, Arizona v. United States, 104 F.3d 1095 (9th
Cir. 1996) (No. 96-1595); California v. United States, 104 F.3d 1086 (9th Cir. 1996) (No. 96-1596)
(citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2) ("[T]he Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be
suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it."),
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/osg/briefs/1996/w961595a.txt (last visited Feb. 13, 2003).
238. Respondents' Brief at 10 n.3, Arizona (No. 96-1591); California (No. 96-1596).
239. Id. (alterations in original) (internal citations omitted).
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been invaded by illegal aliens, and the lower federal courts recurrently held
that this assertion presented a nonjusticiable, political question. These cases
will be examined in detail below.
In Chiles v. United States,240 the State of Florida and its representatives
filed suit against the United States, alleging that the United States failed to
appropriately enforce immigration policies and accordingly caused the State
of Florida to incur tremendous expense in providing funding for illegal
aliens. 24' The plaintiffs sought an injunction that required the United States to
pa5, restitution until the immigration laws were properly enforced; they
maintained that they were entitled to judicial relief because "[t]he national
political process has provided no adequate safeguard. 2 42  Consequently, the
plaintiffs asserted, among other claims,243 that the federal government's lax
immigration control policies violated the Invasion Clause because illegal
aliens had invaded the State of Florida.244
Applying the political question doctrine, the Chiles court held that the
Invasion Clause claim presented a political question for the following reasons.
First, it was well settled that the federal government possessed plenary control
over immigration, and the plaintiffs' claims related directly to immigration
and the admission of aliens.245 Thus, a textually demonstrable commitment to
a coordinate branch of government existed.246 Second, because the plaintiffs
sought an injunction regarding the federal government's enforcement of the
immigration laws, this decision would be well "beyond the competence of the
Court as it would involve the Court in matters relating to the conduct of
foreign relations and the deployment of the military forces of the United
240. 874 F. Supp. 1334 (S.D. Fla. 1994), aff'd, 69 F.3d 1094 (11 th Cir. 1995).
241. Id. at 1335-36.
242. Id. at 1336.
243. In addition to the Invasion Clause claim, the plaintiffs asserted three additional counts in
their complaint. In Count I, "Plaintiffs allege[d] that they [we]re entitled to grants from an
Immigration Emergency Fund administered by the Attorney General of the United States, and they
ask[ed] the Court to direct that Defendants develop a plan to disburse that fund." Id. In Count II,
plaintiffs maintained that they were entitled to restitution based on the United States' failure to
enforce the administration laws. Id. In Count III, the plaintiffs asserted that the federal government
must provide Medicaid and AFDC in Florida because the State of Florida was disproportionately
affected by the restrictions on these programs that limited the payment of funds to certain aliens. Id.
244. Id.; see also id. at 1342; BILL O'REILLY, THE No SPIN ZONE 140 (2001) ("Someone needs
to remind our leaders that we have a Constitution and that it requires, among other things, that the
federal government protect the states from invasion.").
245. Chiles, 874 F. Supp. at 1339. The Chiles court opined: "It is undisputed that the Federal
Government's control over immigration is plenary. 'The authority to control immigration-to admit
or exclude aliens-is vested solely in the Federal Government."' Id. (quoting Truax v. Raich, 239
U.S. 33, 42 (1915)).
246. Id. at 1343.
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States. 247 The court expressed assent to the federal government's assertion
that "[t]he Constitution provides no criteria either for determining when a
peacetime influx of immigrants has risen to the level of an 'invasion,' or for
assessing the adequacy of the federal government's response to such a
threat.,
248
Third, the court held that the claim presented a political question because
the court had no judicially manageable standards to determine "when the
migration, as well as the costs associated with such migration, reaches the
point at which it invades the State of Florida's state sovereignty. ' 249 Thus, the
court did not have jurisdiction to hear the claim, and it deferred the question
for resolve through the legislative and executive branches.25°
Other courts have employed parallel reasoning and formulated holdings
similar to the holding of the Chiles court.25' In Padavan v. United States,252
the State of New York and its representatives alleged that the federal
government had failed to control the influx of illegal aliens into the state and
that this influx constituted an invasion.253 The plaintiffs sought monetary
247. Id Counsel for the United States argued that "protection of the United States from illegal
immigration implicates matters of foreign policy and defense into which courts will intrude only with
the greatest reluctance." On Petition For a Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit, Brief For the Respondents in Opposition at 7, Chiles v. United States, 69
F.3d 1094 (1 1th Cir. 1995) (No. 95-1249), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/osg/briefs/1995/w951249w.txt (last visited Feb. 13, 2003). But see Baker v.
Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211 (1962) ("[I]t is error to suppose that every case or controversy which touches
foreign relations lies beyond judicial cognizance.").
248. Respondent's Brief at 7, Chiles (No. 95-1249).
249. Chiles, 874 F. Supp. at 1344. With respect to this finding, the court opined:
In order to grant the restitution requested by Plaintiffs, the Court would be forced to review
the United States [sic] entire enforcement of Federal immigration laws including the
enforcement methods used and their effectiveness, determine the reasonableness of budget
allocations, determine whether more resources are available and, if so, decide how those
addition [sic] resources should be allocated. The Court is unable to identify satisfactory
criteria for making these determinations.
Id.
250. Id.
251. Additionally, some states have asserted claims similar in substance to the states' Invasion
Clause claims, but have proffered their claims pursuant to the Naturalization Clause rather than the
Invasion Clause. For example, in Texas v. United States, 106 F.3d 661 (5th Cir. 1997). the State of
Texas and its representatives brought suit against the federal government, alleging that the federal
government breached its duty to the states to regulate immigration pursuant to the Naturalization
Clause. Id. at 665-66. The court held that this claim presented a political question for the same
reasons that other courts have found the Invasion Clause claims to be nonjusticiable. Id. One of the
named plaintiffs in Texas v. United States was then-governor and current President of the United
States, George W. Bush.
252. 82 F.3d 23 (2d Cir. 1996).
253. Id. at 28.
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support to compensate the state for funds it expended in accordance with the
federal government's immigration policy.2 5 4  The court held that the claim
presented a political question for two reasons. First, because there existed a
constitutional textual commitment to Congress of naturalization regulation,
"'the power over aliens is of a political character and therefore subject only to
narrow judicial review.'''255  Second, "[t]he protection of the states from
'invasion' involves matters of foreign policy and defense, which are issues
that the courts have been reluctant to consider., 256 Additionally, the court
opined that, assuming that the claim presented a non-political question, the
claim was not colorable because "[i]n order for a state to be afforded the
protections of the Invasion Clause, it must be exposed to armed hostility from
another political entity. 257 Thus, the court dismissed the Invasion Clause
claim as a nonjusticiable, political question.258
Similarly, the court in New Jersey v. United States259 dismissed the state's
"alien invasion" claim brought pursuant to the Invasion Clause claim because
it presented a political question.260 The court cited the following reasons to
support its holding. First, the Naturalization Clause represented a textually
demonstrable commitment to Congress. 1  Second, because the regulation of
the relationship between aliens and the United States "'must be defined in the
light of changing political and economic circumstances, such decisions are
frequently of a character more appropriate to either the Legislature or the
254. Id. The allegations of "invasion" were supported by convincing statistics: the plaintiffs
asserted that, in 1993, "the cost to New York State and its subdivisions of providing services to legal
and illegal immigrants amounted to $5.6 billion." Id.
255. Id. at 27 (quoting Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792 (1977)).
256. Id. at 28 (citing Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Bd., 512 U.S. 298 (1994); Chicago
& S. Air Lines v. Waterman S.S., 333 U.S. 103, 111 (1948)).
257. Id. (citing THE FEDERALIST No. 43 (James Madison)); see also California v. United
States, 104 F.3d 1086, 1091 (9th Cir. 1997) ("California ignores the conclusion set forth by our
Founders."); Arizona v. United States, 104 F.3d 1095 (9th Cir. 1997); New Jersey v. United States,
91 F.3d 463, 468 (3d Cir. 1996) (dismissing the state's Invasion Clause claim premised on an alleged
"illegal alien" invasion because "[the State of New Jersey] offers no support whatsoever for
application of the Invasion Clause to this case or for its reading of the term 'invasion' to mean
anything other than a military invasion").
258. Padavan, 82 F.3d at 28; see also Barber v. Hawaii, 42 F.3d 1185, 1199 (9th Cir. 1994)
(finding without discussing that allegations of invasion premised on Japan's economic invasion of
Hawaii constituted a nonjusticiable political question).
259. 91 F.3d 463 (3d Cir. 1996).
260. Id. at 470.
261. Id. at 469; see also California v. United States, 104 F.3d 1086, 1091 (9th Cir. 1997)
("[T]he issue of protection of the States from invasion implicates foreign policy concerns which have
been constitutionally committed to the political branches."); Arizona v. United States, 104 F.3d 1095
(9th Cir. 1997).
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Executive than to the Judiciary.' ' '262  Third, the court lacked judicially
manageable standards to resolve the immigration issue because this issue
"involve[s] policy judgments about resource allocation and enforcement
methods.... [T]hey are by their nature peculiarly appropriate to resolution
by the political branches of government... because... independent
resolution of such issues by a court would express a lack of the respect due a
coordinate branch of government., 263  Therefore, precedent dictates that
courts will find any claim of an "alien invasion" brought pursuant to the
Invasion Clause to be a nonjusticiable, political question, but, as discussed
shortly,264 claims of a "terrorist invasion" may be wholly distinguishable from
this line of cases.
V. JUDICIAL ENFORCEMENT OF THE INVASION CLAUSE
This Comment advocates the position that the Court should reach the
merits of an Invasion Clause claim and render the following decision: The
Court should issue a declaration that the federal government has failed to
comply with the Invasion Clause and, to protect the states from a future
terrorist invasion, order restitution until constitutional compliance is attained
or order the deployment of the military or a large number of border personnel
and technological equipment to the northern border. As discussed in this Part,
a number of rationales support this conclusion. First, the states likely have
suffered pecuniary injuries in attempting to prevent acts of terrorism, and
these damages likely are traceable to the government's lax border control
policies; if the states can quantify these damages and establish a nexus, they
will have standing to assert the Invasion Clause claim. Second, even if a court
would choose to apply the components of the Baker Court's political question
doctrine, the Invasion Clause claim arguably does not fall within these
components, and a court may find that the claim is justiciable. Third,
assuming that the political question doctrine is thriving in the area of foreign
affairs, a court may find that the issue of homeland security does not
sufficiently touch on foreign affairs to require judicial abstention. Lastly,
because the modern Court has become politicized and rarely has deferred
political questions to the political branches, the Court may not apply the
262. New Jersey, 91 F.3d at 469-70 (citing Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 81 (1976)); see also
California v. United States, 104 F.3d 1086, 1091 (9th Cir. 1997) ("For this Court to determine that
the United States has been 'invaded' when the political branches have made no such determination
would disregard the constitutional duties that are the specific responsibility of other branches of
government, and would result in the Court making an ineffective non-judicial policy decision.");
Arizona v. United States, 104 F.3d 1095 (9th Cir. 1997).
263. New Jersey, 91 F.3d at 470.
264. See infra Part V.
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political question doctrine and may reach the merits of the Invasion Clause
claim without hesitation.
A. The Doctrine of Standing
The states must satisfy the doctrine of standing before a court will
entertain the merits of an Invasion Clause claim against the federal
government.265 Modernly, courts have "heightened standing requirements to
deny judicial review to a broader range of cases. ' 266 In the Invasion Clause
cases, the sole court to discuss the issue of standing found that the State of
Florida had standing to bring the Invasion Clause claim against the federal
government. The court merely provided: "[B]ecause an order against the
named defendants would offer some relief to Florida, we suppose that the
State does have standing to raise this claim. 267 As applied to the present
analysis, the doctrine of standing dictates that the states must assert an injury
that is fairly traceable to the federal government's lax border control policies,
and the injury must be redressable by either a military or personnel
deployment to the border or restitution to provide for augmented border
security.268
None of the 9/11 terrorists entered our nation through its northern or
southern border.269 Consequently, the states likely cannot utilize the damages
suffered from the attacks of 9/11 to fulfill the requirements of standing
because, unless it can be proven differently, these pecuniary damages are not
fairly traceable to the federal government's lax border control policies. The
states could, however, quantify the funds expended on terrorism prevention
since 9/11 to prove they have standing to claim that the federal government
has not complied with the Invasion Clause.
To establish standing, the states must uncover the following information
and perform a number of analyses regarding this information. Have any of
the states expended their own funds to augment border security or police
presence near the borders, and can this expense be linked to the federal
government's failure to expend these funds? Has a state expended funds on
terrorism detection or prevention that would not have been expended but for
the federal government's lax border control policies? Did any of the
individuals currently in custody for suspected terrorist activity enter our
nation illegally through the northern border? Did the states expend funds to
265. See supra Part III.C. 1.
266. Sandstrom Simard, supra note 147, at 306.
267. Chiles v. United States, 69 F.3d 1094, 1096 (1 1th Cir. 1995).
268. See generally Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984).
269. MALKIN, supra note 3, at 240.
[87:167
THE ROLE OF THE INVASION CLA USE POST-9/111
capture these individuals, and did a causal link exist between the federal
government's lax border control policies and the entrance of these terrorists
through our borders? Have the states expended funds to prevent terrorists
from transporting weapons into the country, and can this expense be linked to
the federal government's lax border control policies?
Furthermore, although the events of 9/11 cannot be linked to the federal
government's lax border control policies between established checkpoints,
other terrorists have entered or attempted to enter the nation through its
northern border. For example, two of the three terrorists that conspired to
commit the 1999 "Millennium" attacks on America "snuck back and forth
across the U.S.-Canadian border," as did one of the 1997 New York subway
bombing conspirators. 270 To obtain standing, the states must prove that these
incidents are directly linked to the government's lax border control policies
and that the states expended funds related to these conspiracies. Although this
information may be difficult to obtain and link to the federal government's
inaction,271 the states have a viable argument regarding the relation between
the expended funds and the federal government's inaction because of the
well-documented chaos on the northern border.
At this time, if the states fail to establish any nexus between the funds
they have expended on border control or terrorism prevention and the federal
government's failure to control our borders, the states may have a difficult
time establishing that any injury resulting from the acts of 9/11 or terrorism in
general is linked to the federal government's lax border control policies, and
the claim may not be ripe for judicial review.272 Disturbingly, if the states are
unable to identify an injury-in-fact and link the injury to the federal
government's lax border control policies, the federal judiciary will refuse to
reach the merits of the claim until the government's inaction causes terrorists
to illegally enter our northern border between established crossing points and
harm or kill more innocent Americans. In the name of public policy and
270. Id.
271. This information could be derived through, for example, the following means:
interviewing accused terrorists in custody post-9/1 I to determine if any of these individuals illegally
entered the country through the northern border, determining whether states have expended funds to
capture or detain these individuals, quantifying the funds that border states have expended to
augment border security, quantifying the funds that border states have expended on terrorism
detection.
272. As discussed in the following section, the states may also have a difficult time proving a
redressable injury because the requested remedy may not be judicially manageable. Furthermore,
even if the Court would find that the states satisfied the constitutional components of standing, the
Court could elect to find that the states failed to satisfy the prudential components, as "the Court has
rejected cases that allege 'generalized grievances,' injuries that are not peculiar to an individual or a
small body of people, even when the 'technical' injury-in-fact specification is satisfied." Blumoff,
supra note 151, at 310.
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because of the elevated likelihood that this type of attack could occur, the
citizens of this country can only hope that the Court will address the chaos on
the border before more innocent citizens are murdered.
B. Baker v. Carr and the Justiciability of The Invasion Clause
Although it appears unlikely that the Rehnquist Court would apply the
political question doctrine to the vast majority of domestic cases or
controversies before it, this section will assume that the states satisfied the
doctrine of standing and that the Baker Court's political question doctrine
would be applied to any Invasion Clause claim brought before any court. This
Comment concludes that even if the Baker elements are applied to an Invasion
Clause claim, the claim arguably could be justiciable. The components of the
Baker Court's political question doctrine most relevant to the present analysis
will be examined in detail.
1. A Textually Demonstrable Constitutional Commitment
This component of the Baker Court's political question doctrine will be
examined from two different perspectives. First, this component will be
analyzed assuming that the states request relief that includes border
militarization. Second, this component will be analyzed assuming the states'
request for relief does not include border militarization, but does include a
request for increased Border Patrol agents and improved technological
equipment or an award of restitution until constitutional compliance with the
Invasion Clause is attained.
If the states request the federal judiciary to order border militarization,
there likely exists a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of this
issue to Congress. The Constitution grants to Congress the power "[t]o
provide for calling forth the militia to execute the laws of the Union, suppress
insurrections, and repel invasions. 273  Thus, the plain language of the
Constitution commits to Congress the power to determine whether the
military should be deployed to the borders, and if a court chooses to apply this
Baker factor, it likely would find that the judiciary must defer to Congress's
decision regarding this matter.
Conversely, a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment to the
political branches likely does not exist for the states' request for an increase in
border personnel that are not military personnel or for an award of restitution.
In the prior line of Invasion Clause cases, the lower courts succinctly and
unanimously found that a constitutional commitment to Congress existed to
273. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 15.
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regulate immigration and naturalization. This finding was accurate, as the
Constitution provides as follows: "The Congress shall have power... [t]o
establish a uniform rule of naturalization. 274  However, although the
Constitution grants Congress plenary power to address immigration issues, an
increase in border personnel for homeland security purposes neither falls
within this, nor any other, textually demonstrable commitment to Congress or
the President for the following reasons.
The federal judiciary is specifically bound by the text of the Invasion
Clause, which provides that "[t]he United States... shall protect each of [the
states] against invasion.', 275 Although in the context of the Guarantee Clause,
which is located in the same phrase as the Invasion Clause, the Court has
found the term "United States" to include only Congress,276 the plain meaning
of the Invasion Clause binds all branches of the federal government, including
the federal judiciary. The Invasion Clause does not contain a textually
demonstrable commitment to the political branches; "[q]uite the contrary...
it unambiguously says 'the United States' and includes all of the branches of
the federal government., 277  Because the federal judiciary specifically is
bound by this Clause, deference to the political branches would be wholly
improper.
Similarly, the placement of the Invasion Clause within the Constitution
supports the lack of a textually demonstrable commitment to the political
branches.278 If the Framers intended the Invasion Clause to be subject to only
congressional enforcement, "it likely would have been placed in Article I
which defines congressional powers. The text of the Constitution simply does
not support excluding judicial enforcement., 279 Thus, the placement of the
Invasion Clause supports a lack of a textually demonstrable constitutional
commitment to Congress.
Moreover, many of the laws passed post-9/1 1 have recognized terrorism
274. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4. Additionally, in Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S.
651 (1892), the Supreme Court enumerated a number of constitutional clauses that could be said to
grant Congress plenary power over immigration, including "the Congressional treaty power, the
Commerce Clause, the power to enforce a uniform rule of naturalization, the power to declare war,
the power given to maintain and provide for armies and navies, and the Necessary and Proper
Clause." Timothy W. Hagedom, Illegal Immigration and the State Predicament: Has the Federal
Government Commandeered State Legislative Processes?, 8 MD. J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 271,
291 (1997) (citing Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 659 (1892)).
275. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4 (emphasis added).
276. See, e.g., Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. 1, 42 (1849).
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and alienage as mutually exclusive issues. 280 The immigration and nationality
laws define "naturalization" as "the conferring of nationality of a state upon a
person after birth, by any means whatsoever., 28' Additionally, "alien" is
defined as "any person not a citizen or national of the United States., 282 An
"immigrant" is defined as "every alien except an alien who is within one of
the following classes of nonimmigrant aliens-.., an alien.., having a
residence in a foreign country which he has no intention of abandoning and
who is visiting the United States temporarily for business or temporarily for
,,283pleasure. As the 9/11 terrorists so repugnantly illustrated to the nation,
terrorists penetrate the United States for pleasure and to perform "business";
consequently, the law classifies these and other terrorists as nonimmigrants-
and only Congress has plenary power under the Constitution to regulate
immigrants.
Further, even plain-meaning connotations of the words "alien" and
"terrorist" conjure different definitions: an alien is motivated to enter the
nation for a reason other than perpetrating acts of destruction and usually
intends to remain in the country for a certain period of time, but a terrorist
enters the nation with the intent to perpetrate acts of devastation and abscond
if still alive. Because terrorists and non-terrorist immigrants are mutually
exclusive, and because Congress has plenary power to regulate immigrants
and not terrorists, no textually demonstrable constitutional commitment to
Congress exists for issues regarding homeland security.
With regard to the conclusion that there exists no textually demonstrable
constitutional commitment to Congress to regulate homeland security, dissent
will reverberate from those who oppose an increase in border personnel. This
dissent will result from the following fact: If the Court orders the federal
government to protect the states by means of increased border personnel, this
increased border personnel will have the effect of thwarting the entrance of
illegal aliens, as well as terrorists, into our country, and Congress has plenary
power under the Constitution to regulate immigration.
This argument is devoid of merit. If the Court renders such a decision,
any incursion on Congress's plenary power to regulate immigration and
naturalization would be only incidental; modernly, courts recurrently render
decisions that have incidental or even direct effects on the powers of other
branches, including decisions that infringe Congress's plenary power over
280. Victor C. Romero, Postsecondary School Education Benefits for Undocumented
Immigrants.- Promises and Pitfalls, 27 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 393, 418 (2002).
281. 8 U.S.C.S. § I 101(a)(23) (Law. Co-op. 2002).
282. Id. § (a)(3).
283. Id. § (a)(15)(B).
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284immigration. Therefore, the Court's decision to increase border personnel
would only incidentally affect Congress's immigration power, and no facially
textually demonstrable constitutional commitment to Congress exists.
2. Judicially Discoverable and Manageable Standards
In the prior Invasion Clause cases, the courts unanimously held that there
existed a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards to resolve
the states' claims that illegal aliens had invaded the states. The courts
asserted the following rationales to support their findings: "[T]he Court is
unable to identify... a manageable standard for determining when the
migration, as well as the costs associated with such migration, reaches the
point at which it invades the [state's] state sovereignty"; 28 5 the issue
"involve[s] policy judgments about resource allocation and enforcement
methods"; 28 6 and "there are no manageable standards to ascertain whether or
when an influx of illegal immigrants should be said to constitute an
invasion.,
287
Applying these findings to the present Invasion Clause inquiry, after the
events of 9/11, judicially manageable standards exist to determine whether an
invasion of the states occurred. Terrorists invaded our states when they
288
reached our mainland soil and murdered innocent Americans. Because of
the global instability that resulted from the terrorist attacks, there certainly
exists a chance that terrorists or another foreign entity will again invade the
states, and it was for this precise reason that the Invasion Clause was included
in the Constitution. 289 Determining whether a terrorist invasion occurred is
much less complicated than determining whether a sufficient number of
illegal aliens have invaded a state's sovereignty. Consequently, a court will
likely find it has manageable standards to determine that an invasion occurred
and that the states are at risk for further invasion, and the Invasion Clause
claim likely would be found to be colorable if the Court reached the merits of
the claim. However, formulating a judicially manageable remedy pursuant to
which the federal government must provide sufficient protection from
invasion presents a much different inquiry.
A determination of what constitutes' "sufficient protection" from a
284. See supra note 227 and accompanying text.
285. See supra note 249 and accompanying text.
286. See supra note 263 and accompanying text.
287. See id
288. The Framers failed to distinguish between an invasion perpetrated by a terrorist
organization or an invasion perpetrated by a foreign state or country; consequently, the fact that
terrorists, rather than a recognized foreign state, invaded our mainland soil is likely inconsequential.
289. See supra Part IV.A.
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possible future terrorist invasion is a difficult determination for any political
branch to articulate. A chief Border Patrol agent has asserted that "[a]n
estimated 20,000 troops would be needed to provide a credible border force
along both U.S. land borders., 290  Another commentator estimated that
100,000 Border Patrol and interior enforcement agents would be necessary to
plug our porous borders.291  The amount and quality of technological
equipment on the borders would also aid in protection and lessen the number
of personnel needed on the borders; this equipment could include surveillance
or sensing technology, marine vessels,292 "sensors, night scopes, helicopters,
light planes, all terrain vehicles, 293 and unmanned surveillance planes.294
Determining the amount of personnel and equipment that is necessary to
sufficiently protect the states and the American people from further terrorist
invasion is a daunting task for any member of the federal government,
especially considering that no amount of border security will definitively
thwart the entry of every individual that desires to illegally enter the United
States.295
This Comment concludes that the federal judiciary has manageable
standards to determine what border control measures would provide the states
sufficient protection from invasion. The federal judiciary recurrently has
applied "generalized and ambiguous abstract principles to specific factual
situations, even when the application of those principles is unclear,, 296 and
"there is no reason why the judiciary is uniquely less qualified to be involved
[in this determination] than the other branches of the federal government., 297
Further, few constitutional standards are judicially manageable,298 and the
court has not shied from interpreting and applying vague constitutional
standards such as the Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection Clause.
As one commentator maintained: "[O]ne would think that the Due Process
Clause would be a prime example of a constitutional clause that lacks
290. Diaz, Ramstad Urges Reinforced Borders, supra note 37.
291. John Hawkins, Twelve Questions with Michelle Malkin, at
http://rightwingnews.com/interviews/malkin.php (last visited Feb. 10, 2003) [hereinafter Hawkins,
Twelve Questions with Michelle Malkin].
292. Senate Hearing, supra note 6 (statement of Sen. Dorgan).
293. 8 U.S.C.S. § 1101 (Law. Co-op. 2002).
294. Malone, Eyes in Sky Help Watch Borders, supra note 16.
295. Gorman, A Nation Without Borders, supra note 34.
296. Redish, supra note 136, at 1050.
297. Chemerinsky, Guarantee Clause, supra note 137, at 870.
298. Champlin & Schwarz, supra note 174, at 225-26; see also Pushaw, supra note 157, at 500
("[A] 'lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards' seemingly exists in many
constitutional clauses, not merely those triggering political questions.").
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'judicially discoverable and manageable standards.' ' 299  Consequently,
because the Supreme Court has not hesitated to develop "necessary standards
for undefined terms, 3 °° the Court is as able as any other branch to formulate a
necessary standard for border protection even though "protection" is
undefined in the Constitution.
Furthermore, the Supreme Court can determine what constitutes sufficient
"protection" from invasion because a zealous advocate would present the
Court with the same information addressing the necessity for augmented
border security that would be presented to Congress or the President.
30 1
Currently, federal inspection services are performing studies to determine "the
most effective mix of staff and technology necessary to achieve an optimal
level of border security. 30 2 No compelling reason exists as to why the results
of this and similar studies, as well as the opinions of Border Patrol agents,
government officials, civilians, and members of the Department of Homeland
Security as to what constitutes sufficient "protection," could not be presented
before the Court just as they could be presented before Congress. These
issues "can be addressed as they always are, namely, through the use of
interrogatories, depositions, testimony and all the other means of gathering
evidence. 30 3
Additionally, "[w]hile it is true that 'political question' cases.., involve
issues as to which fact-gathering is difficult, this does not at all justify
invocation of a barrier to decision. 30 4 Although it may be difficult for the
federal judiciary, just as it would be for Congress and the President, to
determine what constitutes sufficient "protection" from future terrorist
invasion, "this is an argument for great caution," not an argument for absolute
299. Sandstrom Simard, supra note 147, at 331 n.162; see also Chemerinsky, Guarantee
Clause, supra note 137, at 871 ("[T]here is no reason why 'republican form of government' is more
lacking in standards than 'due process' or 'equal protection."'); Redish, supra note 136, at 1047 ("It
is difficult for me to understand why the words 'republican form of government' in article IV are
thought not to be susceptible to judicial interpretation, while the words 'due process' or 'equal
protection' are deemed not to suffer from this difficulty.").
300. Breuer, supra note 133, at 1056 ("[U]nfazed by a lack of textually identifiable limits, the
Court consistently decided issues of scope and identified limits impacting constitutional provisions,
e.g., when punishment is 'cruel and unusual,' when bail is '[e]xcessive,' when searches and seizures
are 'unreasonable,' and when congressional action is 'necessary and proper."').
301. Charney, supra note 223, at 102.
302. William J. Krouse & Raphael F. Perl, CRS Report for Congress: Terrorism: Automated
Lookout Systems and Border Security Options and Issues, available at
http://www.fas.org/irp/crs/RL31019.pdf (June 18, 2002).
303. Michael J. Glennon, Foreign Affairs and the Political Question Doctrine, 83 AM. J. INT'L
L. 814, 817 (1989).
304. Tigar, supra note 211, at 1165.
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judicial noninvolvement. °5
Lastly, although judicial determination of what constitutes sufficient
"protection" from invasion certainly is a difficult one, the Court must bear in
mind that the lack of political activism with regard to border control policies
dictates that the Supreme Court truly is the Court of Last Resort for the
resolution of this issue. If the Court defers this issue to the political branches,
the political branches may opt to either decrease border control personnel or
maintain the current level of personnel at our borders; at best, the political
branches will continue their slight and incremental increase of border control
personnel. In the meantime, terrorists can enter this nation through the
unguarded northern border virtually at will.
"' [G]reat tides and currents which engulf the rest of men do not turn aside
in their course and pass the judges by.,, 30 6 Like the rest of Americans,
members of the federal judiciary and their families are American citizens that
surely desire security in their homes and workplaces. Thus, even though a
determination of "protection" is an extensive and complex determination, the
Court must recognize that if it fails to attempt to determine what constitutes
sufficient "protection" from further terrorist invasion, our states will not be
protected. Certainly any amount of protection that the Court finds is
necessary to protect the citizens from harm is superior to the amount of
protection Congress and the President will provide American citizens in the
near future.
3. A Lack of the Respect Due Coordinate Branches of Government
If the federal judiciary finds that Congress and the President's border
control policies have not complied with the Invasion Clause, some may view
this finding as "expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of
government., 30 7 This may be the case; however, "respect due the coordinate
branches of government cannot protect such branches from judicial review
when their acts are challenged on grounds that they failed to adhere to specific
constitutional limits on their authority." 30 8 The federal judiciary must exercise
its duty to interpret and enforce constitutional rights, and the Court's duty is
especially imperative when the political branches are failing to fulfill a
constitutional duty.
Additionally, as our Supreme Court has opined: "'Our system of
government requires ... courts on occasion [to] interpret the Constitution in a
305. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 127, at 103.
306. FISHER & DEVINS, supra note 134, at 1.
307. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 216 (1962).
308. Breuer, supra note 133, at 1059.
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manner at variance ... [with] another branch.' 30 9 It must be kept in mind
that when the federal judiciary exercises power against Congress or the
President, including the widely accepted practice of judicial review, this
always shows a lack of respect due these branches. 3 '0 The judiciary does not
abstain from judicial review because of this possible display of "disrespect"
towards the political branches. Further, our political system has gone direly
astray when the members of our federal government are more concerned with
disrespecting each other than with respecting the lives of American citizens.
Because the political branches have not complied with the Invasion Clause,
and because the Court, as the ultimate interpreter of the Constitution, has not
hesitated to "disrespect" and exercise power against the political branches in
many circumstances, this factor will not require judicial abstention and
deference of the states' Invasion Clause claim to the political branches.
4. Multifarious Pronouncements
No danger of "multifarious pronouncements" exists if the federal judiciary
reaches the merits of an Invasion Clause claim because "the other branches of
government do not act pursuant to the provision. '3 ' Congress and the
President have not employed sufficient measures to protect the states from
invasion, and their inaction "is likely to remain that way."3t 2  Neither
Congress nor the President will publicly proclaim that border security
between established checkpoints will be greatly enhanced, as this news will
infuriate well-organized minority groups; likewise, neither branch will
proclaim that no visible steps will be employed to enhance border protection,
as this news will anger the majority of Americans.313 Thus, in all likelihood,
the political branches will remain virtually silent on the issue, and if the
judiciary proclaims that the federal government must comply with the
Invasion Clause, little danger exists of "multifarious pronouncements."
Further, the political branches may be relieved if the federal judiciary renders
a decision on this matter, as it absolves the political branches from the lose-
lose choice of angering either organized minorities or dispersed majorities. 314
309. Id. at 1059 n.191 (alterations in original) (quoting Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486,
548 (1969)).
310. See Nagel, supra note 162, at 647 (positing that judicial review often, if not always,
expresses a lack of respect due the other branches); Pushaw, supra note 157, at 500 ("[A]ny exercise
of judicial power against the political branches.., shows a 'lack of respect."'). Many commentators
believe that the modem Court has not shied from rendering decisions that exhibit a lack of respect
due Congress or the President. See infra Part V.D.
311. Chemerinsky, Guarantee Clause, supra note 137, at 874.
312. Id.
313. See Hawkins, Twelve Questions With Michelle Malkin, supra note 291.
314. See id.
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C. Homeland Security and Foreign Affairs
Some commentators have suggested that the political question doctrine is
currently thriving in the realm of foreign affairs, but other commentators have
sharply disagreed with this assertion.3 15 In this section, it will be assumed that
the federal judiciary would apply the political question doctrine to any case or
controversy relating to foreign affairs; however, it must be kept in mind that
many courts will render decisions in cases that have foreign affairs
implications without even mentioning the political question doctrine. Thus, in
the context of an Invasion Clause claim brought by the states against the
federal government, this section will address whether the issue of border
control relates to foreign affairs such that judicial deference to the political
branches is appropriate.
Characterizing "homeland security" as an issue "touching on foreign
affairs" drips with irony, but a chance exists that a court would find as such.
Whether or not we desire or intend for this to occur, our nation's border
control policies will affect the Mexican-American and Canadian-American
borders as well as our relations with these countries, thereby implicating
questions of foreign affairs. Some may argue that courts must abstain from
determining any question relating to foreign affairs, no matter how tenuously
the relation can be characterized. This Comment posits that a judicial
mandate requiring increased border control within our nation does not
sufficiently affect foreign affairs to the extent that judicial abstention and
deference is required.
If the flow of traffic at border checkpoints is maintained and border
personnel are placed in the vast and open areas of the border, the flow of legal
commerce and people between Canada and the United States will not be
affected. This would calm the fears of many Canadians and drastically reduce
the extent to which foreign affairs concerns are implicated, as the Canadian
government's most imminent concern relating to border security has been said
to be the need for improved traffic flow at the border.31 6 The "foreign affairs"
issue that would be implicated involves the obstruction of the flow of illegal
commerce between Canada and the United States, but it is difficult to
maintain a straight-faced contention that our judiciary should refrain from
hearing the claim for this reason.
Moreover, although certainly not in every decision, 317 courts historically
have found that questions relating to illegal aliens and immigration are areas
of law "touching on foreign affairs" and are not properly subject to judicial
315. See supra Part III.C.3.
316. MALKN, supra note 3, at 77.
317. See supra Part III.C.3.
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determination. The rationale underlying this judicial abstention is likely as
follows: Because an illegal alien is a resident of another country, if a United
States court assumes jurisdiction over him or her and renders a decision,
especially one addressing that person's liberty, this assumption of jurisdiction
over a non-citizen has obvious foreign affairs implications. Conversely, when
addressing issues of homeland security, the court assumes jurisdiction over
the states and renders a decision to benefit American citizens; this action is
exactly what the province and duty of the federal judiciary entails. Moreover,
if a federal court cannot render a decision regarding national homeland
security, one of the country's most fundamental concerns, because the issue
"touches on foreign affairs," there is little that the courts will be able to
decide, as almost every case or controversy could relate to foreign affairs in
some manner.
318
Additionally, the Mexican and Canadian governments may disagree with
our choice to plug our borders, especially if the military is deployed, but these
governments quite likely will do little else but voice their complaints. 319 The
political question doctrine is alive in the realm of foreign affairs to prevent
courts from placing the nation in international jeopardy; short-lived
disagreement from foreign governments is not what was intended to be
avoided by the application of the political question doctrine to foreign affairs
issues. If the courts were forced to defer a claim for political resolution every
time a foreign nation may disagree with the final decision, the courts would be
forced to abstain from rendering decisions pursuant to most constitutional
provisions, including the constitutionality of the death penalty, as our nation's
death penalty practices provoke much disagreement among the European
nations and Mexico. 320
Lastly, the Baker Court recognized that the federal judiciary may on
occasion hear cases or controversies with foreign relations implications; the
Court stated that "it is error to suppose that every case or controversy which
touches foreign relations lies beyond judicial cognizance." 32' Based on the
relatively minor impact that increased border security would have on foreign
relations and the unruly state of our nation's border security, if ever the Court
were to formulate an exception to the general bar on hearing claims that relate
to foreign relations, the time is now.
318. See supra notes 230 and 231 and accompanying text.
319. See Charney, supra note 223, at 104 ("[Flew cases involving international law and
relations present the possibility of resulting in a decision that could cause significant international
ramifications adverse to the United States." ).
320. See generally EU Memorandum on the Death Penalty, at
http://www.eurunion.org/legislat/DeathPenalty/eumemorandum.thm (last visited Feb. 10, 2003).
321. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211 (1962).
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D. The Supreme Court, Politics, and the Political Question Doctrine
This discussion applying the Baker Court's political question doctrine to
the Invasion Clause in the context of border security is moot if the Court fails
to apply the political question doctrine. The modem Court will often render
decisions with political implications without even acknowledging the
existence of the doctrine; 322 if this occurs, no distinction exists between a
remedy that orders the military or non-military personnel to the border,323 as
both are acceptable remedies if the doctrine is not applied.
Many commentators argue that the political question doctrine should be
abandoned in its entirety, as the Court has found only two cases to present
political questions since the Baker Court's decision.324 Given the modem
Court's activist role in rendering decisions with political implications,325 this
reasoning is extremely persuasive, and it appears that judicial supremacy has
abrogated the political question doctrine.326  The modem Court
"acknowledges few limits on its power to say what the law is,, ' 327 and it has
assumed the view that "it alone among the three branches has been allocated
the power to provide the full substantive meaning of all constitutional
provisions. 328  The federal judiciary has become politicized, and if there
exists "any urge to deny the political character of our public law it arises
largely because we have become so accustomed to courts making such
judgments. 329
322. See supra Part III.C.2.
323. This conclusion is correct assuming that the duties of the military border personnel would
not violate the Posse Comitatus Act. See supra Part II.E.2.
324. See supra Part III.C.2.
325. See Zeigler, supra note 129, at 1367 ("[T]he current Court is very activist, perhaps as
activist as the Warren Court in its heyday."); see also Nagel, supra note 162, at 650 ("[T]he role of
the federal courts in managing public institutions and public policy ha[s] grown significantly.");
Pushaw, supra note 157, at 497 (The political question doctrine "has always been based on
'separation of powers,' but those two concepts mean far different things to the modem Court than
they did to the Framers.").
326. See supra note 203.
327. Barkow, supra note 126, at 302.
328. Id. at 240.
329. Nagel, supra note 162, at 663; see also id. ("The Court and most of the rest of us have
come to regard political questions as legal questions because that is a convenient (perhaps necessary)
precondition to maintaining or extending the scope and scale of judicial supervision of public
policy."); Pamela S. Karlan, Lessons For Getting the Least Dangerous Branch Out of the Political
Thicket, 82 B.U. L. REV. 667, 671-72 (2002) ("[T]he Supreme Court is now embroiled in the very
heart of the political thicket. A substantial share of the Court's docket consists of cases involving the
regulation of politics .... If anything, recent history reveals a Court that seems willing to head even
deeper into the woods."). But see id. at 668 ("[W]hen the court strikes down legislative actions, it
'thwarts the will of representatives of the actual people of the here and now; it exercises control, not
in behalf of the prevailing majority, but against it."' (quoting ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST
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Moreover, the political question doctrine "is at odds with the Court's view
of its place in the constitutional order and of its superior competency vis-A-vis
Congress and the Executive to decide all constitutional questions. 330  One
need only mention decisions such as Lochner v. New York,331 Griswold v.
Connecticut,332 and Roe v. Wade333 for support that the Supreme Court will
not hesitate to subscribe judge-made, substantive meaning to undefined
constitutional provisions.334 Further, the Court's recent decision in Bush v.
Gore335 exemplifies the fact that the Court will not hesitate to answer political
questions, as the Court failed to even mention the political question doctrine
in this momentous decision.336 One commentator believes that the members
of the Bush v. Gore Court "took for granted that they had the 'responsibility to
resolve the federal and constitutional issues the judicial system has been
forced to confront.'
337
As the demise of the political question doctrine illustrates, the modern
Court will not hesitate to disregard the political question doctrine and involve
itself in rendering decisions on political issues. If the Court has found itself
able to render decisions that ascribe substantive content to undefined
constitutional provisions 338 and render highly political decisions without even
mentioning the political question doctrine,339 certainly mandating increased
border security in compliance with the Invasion Clause is not outside the
realm of "politicalness" of these other political decisions. Additionally, if the
Court so chooses, it can opt not to formulate a bright-line rule rendering all
Invasion Clause cases or controversies non-political questions; the Court can
DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 16-17 (1962))).
330. Barkow, supra note 126, at 242; see also id. at 241 ("The Rehnquist Court's view of the
relationship among the three branches of the federal government is decidedly more hierarchical than
coordinate. And at the top of that hierarchy sits the Court itself."); Karlan, supra note 329, at 698
("[T]he current Court is deeply distrustful of the political branches and ambitious for its own
power.").
331. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
332. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
333. 410 U.S. 113 (1972).
334. BORK, supra note 138, at 18; see also Chemerinsky, Guarantee Clause, supra note 137, at
859 ("History demonstrates that judicial credibility and legitimacy are not fragile. Some of the
Court's most controversial rulings... ultimately enhanced the judiciary's stature.").
335. 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
336. Barkow, supra note 126, at 242-43. For further discussion addressing the role that the
political question doctrine should or should not have played in Bush v. Gore, see VINCENT BUGLIOSI,
THE BETRAYAL OF AMERICA (2001); Louise Weinberg, The Constitutionality of Bush v. Gore, 82
B.U. L. REv. 609 (2002).
337. Barkow, supra note 126, at 243 (quoting Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 111 (2000)).
338. See supra Part III.C.2.
339. See supra Part III.C.
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limit its justiciability determination to the very unique issue of augmented
border security at the area of our northern border between established crossing
points.
Let us not forget: Terrorists that detest Americans can easily bring
weapons of mass destruction into our country through the porous northern
border, the political branches will not conclusively remedy this issue, and the
federal judiciary is the last means by which the states' constitutional rights
can be enforced. If the Court chooses to do nothing, nothing will be done.
The Rehnquist Court has not shied from political involvement, and whether or
not the average American or the legal scholar supports a politicized judiciary,
certainly this time of national insecurity dictates that the time is right for the
Court to remain consistent with its recent precedent that illustrates the demise
of the political question doctrine, perform its basic judicial duty of
constitutional enforcement, and save the nation from its leaders-that is,
before terrorists invade our country through our borders and cause more
destruction than our country can endure.
VI. CONCLUSION
Crave death.... Make sure that nobody is following you.... Bring
knives, your will, IDs, your passport.... Pray: "Oh God, you who
open all doors, please open all doors for me, open all venues for me,
open all avenues for me.
340
These instructions were found in 9/11 hijacker Mohammed Atta's
luggage.341 Although Atta and his co-conspirators' acts of martyrdom were
their last, innumerable others are willing to follow these instructions. As long
as this terrorist threat remains, the federal government must aggressively
protect our borders to ensure the safety of the citizens of the United States of
America-and the majority of Americans support this conclusion. Yet, the
legislative and executive branches refuse to employ sufficient efforts to plug
the nation's porous Canadian-American border; political, cultural, and
economic concerns foster the federal government's border security apathy.
Because terrorists effortlessly can invade our nation through our porous
borders and perpetuate acts of terrorism, the government's inaction fails to
protect the states from further terrorist invasion and likely violates a
constitutional mandate: The Invasion Clause.
Because the legislative and executive branches have failed to sufficiently
340. MALKIN, supra note 3, at 3 (citing Bob Woodward, In Hyacker's Bags, a Call to
Planning, Prayer, and Death, WASHINGTON POST, Sept. 28, 2001, at A 1).
341. Id.
[87:167
THE ROLE OF THE INVASION CLA USE POST-9/111
protect the states from terrorist invasion in violation of the Invasion Clause,
the federal judiciary is the only means by which the federal government can
be ordered to comply with its constitutional duty. The federal judiciary is the
preeminent branch to enforce controversial constitutional provisions because
it is insulated from majoritarian and political pressures. However, the
judiciary can mandate legislative or executive compliance with the Invasion
Clause only if the states' suit presents a justiciable claim.
Unlike the prior Invasion Clause cases in which the federal courts found
claims of "alien invasions" to present political questions, the states' allegation
that the federal government has failed to protect them from a future hostile
terrorist invasion is wholly distinguishable from this line of cases;
consequently, the modern Court may find this claim to be justiciable. Even if
the federal judiciary would apply the Baker v. Carr Court's political question
doctrine, the states' allegations quite arguably could be found to be
justiciable. Additionally, although the Court may apply the political question
doctrine to issues touching on foreign affairs, the issue of "homeland security"
does not affect foreign affairs to the extent that judicial abstention and
deference is required. Recent precedent dictates, however, that the modern
Court may fail to apply the political question doctrine and will reach the
merits of the Invasion Clause claim. This author implores the Court to reach
the merits of the states' allegations that the federal government's lax border
control policies have violated the Invasion Clause, render a decision in favor
of the states, and potentially save the lives of millions of Americans. The
Court must make this finding in the name of safety and security for the
American people and generations of Americans to follow, as the next terrorist
attack on the United States of America may be far worse than the already
devastating terrorist attack of September 11, 2001.
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